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Abstract
The Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspector General (IG) assesses the
operational readiness and combat effectiveness of units by evaluating individual wings.
Today’s conflicts, however, are waged as a joint force. The Joint Forces Commander
(JFCC) leverages the resources of the entire military complex to achieve strategic
objectives. The synergistic effects, created by the integration of individual weapon
systems, produce greater results than the individual components. Evaluating wings
outside the joint System of Systems (SoS) architecture doesn’t provide a true assessment
of combat readiness. Using a case study method, this research examines the integration
of a joint SoS architecture with the ACC/IG inspection system. This study assesses the
current nature of military operations and the risks associated with joint operations. It
recommends ACC/IG assess the following four joint characteristics during inspections:
rapid integration, interoperability, joint training, and flexibility/adaptability. It outlines
several joint exercises as areas for implementing a joint inspection system. Finally, this
study explores limitations and counter arguments to adopting a joint SoS within the
inspection system. This analysis recommends the ACC/IG assess units through a larger
SoS framework, which offers the possibility to reduce integration risks prior to
deployment and provide a better assessment of wing readiness.
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AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM: A SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS DILEMMA
I. Introduction
General Background
An uncertain global economy, new technological developments, and growing
competition for natural resources create a constantly shifting global environment. The
United States (US) Government continuously monitors this changing environment and
assesses the impact on US national interests. The President of the United States
(POTUS), through the direction of the national strategy, establishes the priorities for US
national interests. The US government relies on the four elements of national power to
preserve and defend the national strategy and shape the global environment1. As one of
the four elements, the nation may call upon the US military on a moment’s notice to
secure and defend those national interests.
As US global policy and national strategy changes, so must the US military.
Admiral Mullins, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), acknowledged this need in
the 2011 National Military Strategy writing, “While the strength of our military will
continue to underpin national security, we must continuously adapt our approaches to
how we exercise power” (Mullins, 2011). The current trends in global change present

1

The four tools available to the US government are: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and
Economic. These four tools are often referred to as DIME
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new challenges for the US military, which in order to ensure an always ready and capable
force, must also evolve. Admiral Mullins further codified this trend stating (2011):
“In this interdependent world, the enduring interests of the United States
are increasingly tied to those of other state and non-state actors. The
complexity of this global system and the challenges therein demand that
we – the Joint Force – think anew about how we lead.”
Today’s military operates as a joint force, combining the capabilities, resources,
and knowledge of the three military branches to increase lethality, flexibility, and
responsiveness2. Strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution span all three
branches. Evolving tactics techniques, and procedures (TTPs), technology,
communications systems, and weapons, used by US and adversarial forces continue to
increase the complexity of warfare. These evolving factors continue to increase the
reliance on and integration of the US service branches. The armed forces of the US,
when operating as a joint force, reflect a System of Systems (SoS) architecture (see
Methodology, Assumptions, and Limitations section for a definition of SoS). According
to Joint Publication (JP) 1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009):
“The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand
that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the
range of military operations…The challenges are best met when the
unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum contribution from
each Service…The resulting synergy from their synchronized and
integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities. Joint warfare

2

For the purpose of this thesis, the three military service branches refer to the Army, Air Force,
and Navy. The Marines and Coast Guard are considered service components of the US Navy.
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is team warfare. Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak
points or seams to an adversary.”
The terms “fully integrated”, “joint team”, “unified action”, “synergy”, and
“synchronized and integrated” alluded to the existence of a joint SoS architecture. The
DoD’s Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems in facts states the “way
military commanders bring together forces and systems to achieve a military objective,”
operates as SoS (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008). Further the guide states that acknowledging
the SoS perspective is critical to the future development of the military force
(ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008). The Joint Chiefs of Staff definition for integration states
“The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by
engaging as a whole” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Compared to the DoD definition of a
SoS, the Joint Chiefs are essentially using the word integration as a substitute for SoS.
As such, each branch must view its capabilities within the joint architecture,
acknowledging how they integrate, operate, and achieve success within this construct.
Further, the characteristics of a joint SoS architecture are manifested in the United States
Air Force (USAF) vision, core competencies, and distinctive capabilities. Each of these
elements reference the needs to support, interoperate, or provide for the joint team (Air
Combat Command, 2013).
Air Combat Command (ACC) relies on the Inspector General (IG) to evaluate
unit combat readiness. The IG manages the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS), which
uses a variety of tools (interviews, inspections, checklists, surveys, self-evaluations, and
staged exercises) to evaluate a unit’s ability to fulfill its wartime mission(s) (United
States Air Force, 2013). “The intent of the IG is to continuously improve the AFIS so
3

there is an ever-shrinking difference--both real and perceived--between mission readiness
and inspection readiness” (United States Air Force, 2013).
Currently the ACC/IG inspects a single wing at a time and thus does not
incorporate a SoS perspective to account for the co-dependency and integration of wings
with other Air Force (AF), Army, Navy, or even coalition partners/weapon systems.
According to JP-1, the NMS, and 2001, 2006, and 2011 Quadrennial Defense Reviews
(QDR), integration and interoperability are necessary for today’s military to achieve
operational and ultimately strategic success. These key strategic documents define
several joint characteristics not fully evaluated during ACC/IG inspections (see Chapter 4
for a list of characteristics). The NMS provides a general summary of these documents
stating the changing global environment and the complex challenges this environment
bring, demand a fully integrated joint force capable of working as one (Mullins, 2011).
While not explicitly stated, these documents are referring to the existence of a joint SoS
and the need to develop forces who can quickly assimilate into the SoS. This work
acknowledges the existence of a joint SoS and the need to evaluate weapon systems
within this architecture. The only way to measure a unit’s capability to meet joint
hallmarks is to evaluate a unit under similar conditions. This work validates the concern
that single wing inspections fall short of capturing the interdependent relationships
characteristic of joint operations.

4

Problem Statement
Today’s joint operational environment is a large system of systems, relying on the
symbiotic relationships which form between weapon systems to create synergistic effects
on the battlefield. JP-1 summarizes this relationship stating (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000):
“Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series of
individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the
integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities.
The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to
joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in unified action.”
It is therefore less effective to evaluate a wing outside the joint construct where its
impact on the SoS cannot be assessed. The Commander of ACC (COMACC) relies upon
the ACC/IG to assess the combat readiness and effectiveness of its assigned forces.
However, the current inspection system does not acknowledge the intra and inter-service
relationships, which form during joint operations and are necessary for mission success.
In addition, the current AFIS process of evaluating a single wing at a time runs counter to
ACC’s strategic vision, which seeks to develop airmen capable of working as integral
parts of the joint force. According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-201, inspection
programs should be consistent with command mission requirements, and are “inherently
wasteful if not directly aligned with mission readiness” (Secretary of the Air Force,
2012). CJCS Guidance 3401D defines readiness as the synthesis of joint forces at the
operational and tactical levels culminating “in the Combatant Commanders' ability to
integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions”
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). This statement from General Dempsey
connects mission readiness with joint readiness. Accordingly, ACC strives to develop
airmen with the proper training, equipment, and resources necessary to project combat
5

power, anytime, anyplace, in order to create effects and conditions aligned with joint
objectives (Hostage, 2012).

Hypothesis
An AFIS which views a wing’s mission within the context of the joint SoS
architecture will provide a better evaluation of a wing’s combat readiness and
effectiveness.

Investigative Questions
The following research questions seek to confirm this work’s hypothesis and lead
to the development of recommendations to improve the current ACC/IG system. The
main research question is:
How can the AFIS be improved to account for the integrated nature of military
warfare reflective of a System-of-Systems architecture?
Specific investigative questions include:
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations?
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system?
3. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of
military assets during operations?
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation
to an operational readiness inspection?
5. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and
determine the status and health of ACC units?

6

Research Focus
The primary focus of this thesis is two fold. First is to establish modern warfare
as a SoS operation where the importance of a wing’s role relies on the relationships
formed between the individual components comprising the SoS. Second is to
demonstrate how evaluating a wing’s combat readiness outside the SoS construction
creates additional risk during joint operations.

Methodology, Assumptions, and Limitations
This work uses an embedded case study research method to answer the main
research question (Yin, 2009). The cost and time of implementing recommendations is
outside the scope of this work. In addition, while recommendations may apply to other
service branches and AF Major Commands (MAJCOM), this work focuses on ACC and
its IG.
This thesis uses the Department of Defense’s (DoD) definition for system of
systems, which states a SoS is “a set or arrangement of systems that results when
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique
capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2004) (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008). Further, the
DoD emphasizes a SoS “consists of parts, relationships, and a whole that is greater than
the sum of the parts” (Department of Defense, 2004).
To clarify the hypothesis it is important to define at what echelon the AF assess
combat readiness/effectiveness. Further, it is important to define the level of war at
which forces integrate and combat readiness/effectiveness impact the joint mission.
Accordingly, this work only examines wing level inspections also known as Unit
7

Effectiveness Inspections (UEI). UEIs and are designed to assess unit readiness and
combat capability (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012). The “iron” or weapon systems
(aircraft, security forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), maintenance, etc), which
provide ACC’s combat capability and deploy in support of joint operations, reside at the
wing level.
The operational and tactical levels of warfare are the two levels where the effects
of weapon systems merge to create synergistic effects. The third level, not explored, is
the strategic level of warfare. The operational level refers to operations conducted among
units and organizations, the proficiency and interaction of units across organizations, and
the integration and coupling of capabilities (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), (Hoing, 2003),
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003). The operational level is the level where operations are
“planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2014). It bridges the gap between the tactical and strategic levels of warfare (Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2014). The tactical level refers to unit level capabilities, daily proficiency at
basic skills, and the application of those skills when required (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2011), (Hoing, 2003), (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003). It is the level at “which battles and
engagements are planned and executed” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014) and “focus on the
ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to
the enemy to achieve combat objectives” (US Army, 2004).
These two levels imply a direct connection between individual units and the
interaction of these forces to achieve specified objectives. At these levels, units must be
proficient and practiced in joint operations to ensure success. The IG’s UEI directly

8

correlates to these two levels of warfare as it seeks to evaluate unit effectiveness and
combat readiness.
Finally, this work does not attempt to determine if the recommended changes
provide a more effective measure of merit.

Implications
This work provides a defendable case for changing how the ACC/IG determines
wing readiness. Applying a joint SoS architecture to wing readiness inspections has
applications outside ACC and the AF. There is a direct application for a similar SoS
approach to DoD acquisition programs during the developmental test and operational test
phases of project management. In addition, other MAJCOMs, service branches, and
COCOMs may wish to adopt an analogous model to reduce risk and provide a better
assessment of force readiness within their organizations.

Preview
The following chapters examine the above research questions and provide
sufficient and verifiable evidence to defend the hypothesis. Chapter 2 provides
contextual information to support chapters three and four. It provides a brief history on
the IG before explaining how the AFIS works. Chapter 2 also provides historical
information on the evolution of joint operations and examines how the AF postures its
forces to meet global taskings. Chapter 3 explains the case study methodology used to
answer the proposed research questions. Chapter 4 analyzes the three case study units of

9

analysis identified in Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 5 restates the hypothesis, summarize
the main research points, and recommends actions and further areas of study.

10

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 provides the necessary background information to support the research
presented in Chapter 4. It examines the rules and regulations governing Joint, AF, and
wing operations. Further, this section examines the AFIS and how the IG implements the
AFIS at the wing level. Chapter 2 also provides information on the history of joint
warfare and its evolution. It provides an understanding of the development of JPs and
how the Air Force postures forces to deploy in response to a Joint Force Commander’s
(JFCC) request. In reviewing the history of joint warfare, this chapter shows how
operations rely on combined effects of joint and coalition capabilities to be successful.
Additionally analyzing joint operations and AF deployment cycle creates an
understanding of the joint SoS wings operate within. Providing this information lays the
framework for why adopting a joint SoS architecture within the AFIS is necessary to
effectively evaluate a wing’s combat capability.

Research Areas and Relevant Research
Similar Research
LtCol Jeffrey Hoing, United States Marine Corp (USMC), conducted similar
research in 2003. Analogous with this work, LtCol Hoing analyzed the Marine Corps
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) and Commanding General’s
Inspection (CGI) programs to determine their effectiveness at measuring Marine Corps
operational readiness. At the time, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were exposing
weaknesses within the services to conduct sustained joint operations. The Secretary of
11

Defense (SECDEF) and CJCS published guidance to all the service branches
emphasizing the importance of interoperability, agility, integrated operations, and
flexibility. LtCol Hoing examined the MCCRES and CGI programs ability and
effectiveness to train, test, and measures these joint characteristics within Marine tactical
aviation units.
Using joint guidance, LtCol Hoing noted a similarity in the definitions for the
operational and tactical levels of warfare. A major point of his research, LtCol Hoing
separated these two levels, relating the tactical level to single unit or person proficiency
in basic skills. His definition for the operational level related to the level at which forces
or units integrate to form the joint force. Further, he decoupled the definitions for combat
readiness and operational readiness. Combat readiness is tactically focused, were
operational readiness is the “organization, manning, and training level of a unit that
allows it to be rapidly deployed, integrated, and immediately employed as part of a joint,
allied, or coalition force” (Hoing, 2003). By separating these definitions, he linked
tactical warfare to combat readiness and operational warfare to operational readiness. He
then focused his work on operational readiness concluding that the Marine Corps has a
fairly robust combat readiness program. This also aligned his work with the issue
addressed by the SECDEF and CJCS
LtCol Hoing examined the evaluation systems of the Navy, AF, Army, and North
Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) to determine how these systems capture the
aforementioned joint characteristics specifically during operation readiness inspections.
Similar to this work, he concludes that the MCCRES and CGI fail to adequately evaluate
operational readiness. He suggests these programs be replaced with evaluation systems
12

that better capture operational skills. He concluded that the only way to successfully
elevate marine tactical air to the next level was to adopt a new system with the ability to
evaluate the effectiveness of units at integrating with other marine and joint
organizations.
Contrary to LtCol Hoing’s work, this work does not differentiate between the
tactical and operational levels, nor combat versus operational readiness. It is the
perspective of this work that all these areas are intertwined. In order to truly adopt a joint
perspective and to better evaluate joint readiness requires a full change from training up
to execution. However, his work is significant in that the general problem statement is a
substandard evaluation system failing to adequately ensure Marine units are prepared for
joint operations.
History of the Inspector General
The Air Force IG traces its lineage back to the American Army of 1777 and the
creation of the IG function (Headquarters US Air Force, 2014). When the AF separated
from the Army in 1947, a similar oversight organization continued to provide oversight
on AF aviation activities (Headquarters US Air Force, 2014). In 1948, General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg officially established the AF IG function. General Vandenberg “outlined the
IG’s mission as: determining the combat and logistic effectiveness of the Air Force,
[and] insuring the maintenance of discipline and security” (Headquarters US Air Force,
2014). The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the AF IG as an independent
organization reporting to military and civilian leaders (Headquarters US Air Force,
2014). A large AF reorganization in 1990 separated the IG’s safety and inspection roles
into two different organizations. The result created the Air Force Safety Center and the
13

Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) as a component of the AF IG. AFIA’s mission
remained strikingly similar to General Vandenberg’s proposed IG, requiring an
organization to independently assess combat capability (Headquarters US Air Force,
2014).
The Air Force Inspection System
AFI 90-201 and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2 govern the AFIS.
AFPD 90-2 acts as the parent document, directing the implementation of an AFIS
overseen by the IG. AFI 90-20 carries out the policies outlined in AFPD 90-2. The
objective of the AFIS is to assess and report on a unit’s readiness, efficiency, and
effectiveness to execute its assigned mission(s). The responsibility of the IG is to
implement and carry out the AFIS by establishing an inspection program consistent with
the command’s mission requirements (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012). AFI 90-201
specifies the AFIS must link inspection compliance with mission readiness to ensure a
robust and efficient program. At the wing level, the AFIS places an emphasis on
identifying unknown risk and developing mitigation strategies (Secretary of the Air
Force, 2012).
To assess and measure a wing’s capability and effectiveness, the IG uses a
checklist derived from AFIs, DoD instructions, joint publications (JPs), public law,
Executive Orders (EO), and other regulatory documents (Secretary of the Air Force,
2012). The complete list of governing regulations is provided in Appendix A. Using
regulatory documents reduces subjectivity and provides a baseline for all wing
inspections. AFI 90-201 specifies four Major Graded Areas (MGAs); Managing
Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit and Executing the Mission (Secretary of
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the Air Force, 2012). Each MGA is comprised of a list of mandatory compliance items
derived from the documents listed in Appendix A. The AF identified high-risk items
within the governing documents and required the MAJCOM/IGs create inspection
checklists using these items as the minimum requirement (Secretary of the Air Force,
2012). Figure 1 shows a model of the MGAs and how they form the core of the AFIS. In
addition to the IG checklist, HAF or MAJCOM commanders may identify supplementary
inspection areas called special interest items (SII).

Figure 1: AFIS Inspection Areas

A MAJCOM/IG inspection, at the wing level or below, is known as a UEI. The
UEI serves two purposes. First, an UEI validates and verifies a wing commander’s
inspection program (CCIP) “for accuracy, adequacy and relevance” (Secretary of the Air
Force, 2012). Second, an UEI delivers an independent assessment of the wing leadership
and the unit’s ability to execute its assigned missions (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).
UEIs are a continual process designed to help Wing/CC’s monitor their wing’s
progression over time (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012). An UEI starts with the self15

identification of deficiencies and areas of risk by a Wing/CC’s compliance team. The IG
periodically samples a wing’s progression to mitigate or correct findings through no
notice inspections or Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) reviews. The cycle
repeats every 24 to 30 months, coinciding with normal two-year assignment cycle for
wing commanders, and culminating each time in a capstone event. The capstone event
includes onsite interviews, exercises, and inspections by MAJCOM/IG personnel. At the
conclusion of a cycle, the MAJCOM/IG authors a report noting a unit’s areas of noncompliance and assigns a score. The report is a reflection of leadership, readiness, and a
wing’s ability to perform its mission(s). Wing and MAJCOM CCs receive final copies of
the report.
The AFIS gives the IG a tool to analyze MAJCOM trends through the
examination of multiple unit inspections. A database of final reports provides MAJCOM
leadership insight into the health and readiness of assigned forces.
The previous version of AFI 90-201 determined the health and capability of AF
wings to meet their peacetime and contingency operational requirements through two
types of inspections:
1) Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI) focused on a wing’s capability to support
home station operations and abide by mandatory laws (Secretary of the Air Force,
2012).
2) Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) focused on a wing’s capability to support
contingency operations. Phase 1 ORIs examined a wing’s ability to posture their
personnel and equipment in preparation for supporting contingency operations. Phase
2 ORIs inspected a wing’s capability to execute and sustain combat operations
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(Secretary of the Air Force, 2012). Phase 2 ORIs simulated a wartime environment
and tested a wing’s capability to operate under the adverse conditions (chemical
environment, base attacks, jamming, limited resources, high ops tempo, etc).
The new AFI 90-201 does not mandate ORIs, but still levees similar
requirements. The shift reflects the change in AFI 90-201 to focus on leadership, reduce
inspection time/duration, and saving money. IG personnel now pre-identify areas to
inspect prior to arrival by monitoring the unit’s self-inspection program and tracking the
unit’s progress on resolving prior deficiencies. The new 90-201 provides the Wing/CC
the opportunity to determine additional areas he/she deems important and build an
inspection system around his/her priorities. Through the development of the CCIP, the
Wing/CC builds his/her own inspection program using ACC/IG provided checklists as a
minimum standard. The role of the AFIS now focuses more on how well the Wing’s IG
conducts the CCIP. Documentation from wing inspections is input into the MICT
database. The ACC/IG regularly monitors a wing’s processes and procedures through
MICT. When the ACC/IG shows up for an inspection, they have already pre-identified
areas they would like to observe based off on MICT inputs. Conversely, MICT also
allows the ACC/IG to identify areas that do not require further inspection. The ACC/IG
ensures wings strike a balance between the four major graded areas while also assessing
how well the commander’s inspection program runs.
In conversations with the ACC/IG personnel, every unit focuses on the MGA
labeled “executing the mission” because ultimately at the end of the day that is
everyone’s foremost duty. However, the IG added that almost any wing can execute the
mission if and when necessary, but at a great expense to its personnel and equipment.
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According to the IG, the remaining three MGAs (Leading People, Managing Resources,
and Improving the Unit) make wings more efficient and effective at executing the
mission. The charge of the ACC/IG is to ensure units develop these efficiencies thereby
reducing mission risks.
Air Combat Command
ACC is one of eight MAJCOMS in the AF, with over 352 total force (TF) units
(active duty, reserve, and guard) and 135,068 military and civilian members (Air Combat
Command, 2013) (Hostage, Air Combat Command Key Talking Points, 2014).
MAJCOMs organize, train, equip, and maintain combat ready forces prepared to conduct
operations on a moment’s notice (Air Combat Command, 2013). ACC’s status of forces
includes 25 different Mission Design Series (MDS) platforms totaling 274 active duty
aircraft, making ACC the preponderant owner of combat aircraft in the AF (Hostage, Air
Combat Command Key Talking Points, 2014). ACC’s list of MDS platforms includes a
wide variety of fighter, bomber, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),
battle management, Command Control and Communication (C3), signals intelligence
aircraft, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) (Air Combat Command, 2013).
In addition to its function as a MAJCOM, ACC serves as the primary force
provider to Joint Forces Command (JFC). In this capacity, ACC responds “to the
combatant commander’s request for conventional forces with a mission ready joint
solution” (U.S. Joint Forces Command). Additionally, ACC must monitor the health of
AF forces to sustain current operational commitments while ensuring future forces are
properly trained, equipped, and combat ready (U.S. Joint Forces Command).
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ACC also acts as the Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) for five of the twelve
Service Core Functions (SCFs) assigned by the SECDEF. The twelve core functions
encompass the full range of AF capabilities. Sustaining and building the SCFs ensures the
AF can provide full combat support to the Joint Force. Table 1 lists the twelve core
functions and the responsible CFLI. The CFLI’s role is to ensure near term and future
planning, development, and sustainment of these capabilities to “help the AF achieve the
strategic and operational objectives of the National Defense Strategy” (Barnhart). In this
capacity, the CFLI also acts as the AF internal integrator of requirements across the
MAJCOMs and is tasked with reducing near and long-range program risk to achieve
SECDEF guidance and direction (Barnhart) (Hostage, 2012).
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Table 1: Air Force Service Core Functions (Barnhart)

Service Core Functions
Air Superiority
Global Precision Attack
Global Integrated ISR
Command and Control
Personal Recovery
Building Partnerships
Nuclear Deterrence Ops
Agile Combat Support
Space Superiority
Cyberspace Superiority
Special Operations
Rapid Global Mobility

Core Function Lead Integrator
Air Combat Command
Air Combat Command
Air Combat Command
Air Combat Command
Air Combat Command
Air Education and Training Command
Air Force Global Strike Command
Air Force Material Command
Air Force Space Command
Air Force Space Command
Air Force Special Operations Command
Air Mobility Command

Joint Operational Architecture
History of Joint Operations
US joint operations trace their beginning to the Revolutionary War when a small
Continental Army and Navy working in conjunction with French naval and ground forces
to defeated the British. In the final battle of the Revolutionary War, General Cornwallis
surrendered to General George Washington at the port city of Yorktown, Virginia.
Simultaneously leveraging the effects of naval and land forces, General Washington
surrounded General Cornwallis’s army, cutting off resupply and reinforcements. While
the small US Navy blocked the channel from British ships and pounded the coast with
artillery, the Continental Army enveloped General Cornwallis’ forces from the land. This
first instance of joint planning and execution highlights the potential force multiplication
created by combining two independent systems.
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Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the
US military operated as three separate branches. Peacetime operations of organizing,
training, equipping, and planning were conducted independently (Locker, 2001).
Military operations were planned and executed separately and operational control of
forces remained with each service (Fogarty, 2006). Service CCs often failed to
communicate or coordinate efforts. The Korean, Vietnam, and Grenada conflicts
highlighted these flaws. Lacking integration, each branch executed the war according to
its own objectives and strategies (Fogarty, 2006). Studies of these operations revealed
communication issues, uncoordinated tactical operations, failed liaison programs, and
separately coordinated operations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).
Goldwater and Nichols also cited the military’s lack of integration and inability to profit
from economies of scale as major reasons for past failures. Further, separate command
structures hindered the development of joint doctrine (Locker, 2001).
The Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the military command structure,
formalizing the need to deploy and operate as a single unified force. The GoldwaterNichols Act established operational control of deployed forces under a single combatant
commander (Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1985). Service chiefs were cut out
of the operational chain of command and assigned the primary role of organizing,
training, and equipping forces in support of combatant commander requirements (United
States Congress, 1986). The Goldwater Nichols Act created a joint SoS architecture
unified under the COCOMs. COCOMs assign a single or multiple JFCCs to lead
operations within their geographic area of responsibility. JFCCs continuously modify
their joint organization throughout operations to provide the right mixes of forces and
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equipment to achieve mission success (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). Operation Just
Cause, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (also known as
Operation New Dawn) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have tested the JFC
construct. According to JP-1 the JFCC’s role is to create unity of effort and unified action
among participating organizations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).
Joint Publications
JPs are standing documents, written and approved by the COCOMs, service
branches, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). JPs were created to provide guidance on the
employment of joint forces. The primary purpose for creating JPs was to establish unity
of command and unity of effort during joint operations (Furr, 1991). Prior to 1986, the
development of joint doctrine was hindered by a lack of clear guidance determining who
was responsible for creating and enforcing doctrine. In addition, COCOMs were not
required to participate and service branches were not obligated to follow joint policy
(Furr, 1991). Service components were responsible for developing their own operational
doctrine “with provision for coordination between services” (Cushman, 1985). A 1985
Senate Armed Services Committee report identified “poorly developed joint doctrine as
one of the major systems of inadequate unified military advice” (Furr, 1991). Further,
the report stated, “the joint operational effectiveness of military forces is dependent upon
the development of joint doctrine and sufficient joint training to be able to effectively
employ it” (Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1985). The Goldwater-Nichols Act
empowered the CJCS and assigned the chairman full responsibility for the development
and establishment of joint doctrine. The Act required all services to comply with joint
publications (Furr, 1991).
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In this regard, JP-1 continues to echo the words of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
stating “successful joint operations merge capabilities and skill sets of assigned service
components. Interoperability and effective integration of service capabilities enhance
joint operations to accomplish US Government objective(s)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2013). Today, AFIs provide additional guidance on how AF units will implement JP
procedures.
Unit Mission Development
In planning for deployments, wings train and prepare to execute their assigned
missions. Wings must also maintain the proper mix of equipment to support necessary to
support their assigned missions. A wings’s weapon system determines the types of
missions it can accomplish (a weapon system can be an aircraft or job function). A Joint
Staff supporting a COCOM determines the missions and equipment necessary to achieve
the COCOMs goals. The Joint Operational Planning Process and Global Force
Management Process are two documents used to link missions to specific wings as well
as assign and set time-tables for the movement of forces should they be required.
Mission development is a joint function that begins with the President approving
and publishing the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Unified Command Plan (UCP).
These documents provide the US’s strategic outlook and establish the responsibilities and
roles of the COCOMs respectively (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Joint Staff-7, 2011)
(Santacrose, 2011). The SECDEF uses the NSS to establish DoD “policy goals and
priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of forces” (Santacrose,
2011). The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the venue through which the SECDEF
presents his/her priorities. Further, the SECDEF authors the Guidance for Employment of
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the Force (GEF) which “consolidates and integrates five separate guidance documents
into a single strategic directive” providing “clearer linkages from strategy to
operations/activities” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Santacrose, 2011).
Contained within the GEF is guidance on campaign planning, a major part of how units
receive their mission (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).
The CJCS outlines the global military strategy and strategic direction in the NMS
document, using the NDS, NSS, and GEF as a framework. The NDS, NSS, and GEF
“provide ‘the what,’ and the NMS provides the ‘how’ in aligning ends, ways, means, and
risk to accomplish the missions called for in support of U.S. national interests and
objectives” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008). In addition, the CJCS helps
author the UCP. The UCP contains the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The
JSPS tasks the COCOMs to create their Campaign Plans. Campaign Plans establish the
COCOMs end state and steady state vision for their area of responsibility. Campaign
Plans include force posture, security requirements, alliances, and goals (Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Santacrose, 2011). Figure 2 depicts a graphical
representation detailing the steps required to create a Campaign Plan.
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Figure 2: Joint planning and development process (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011)

Operational Plans (OPLAN) and Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) are two subsets
of the larger Campaign Plan (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). They are pre-developed
military plans created to respond to potential threats and regional instability. These plans
present COCOMs with quick options for returning to a steady state and are anticipatory
in nature. Each OPLAN and CONPLAN contains the COCOM’s force and equipment
requirements to achieve his or her desired end state. OPLANs and CONPLANs also
contain Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).
The TPFDD includes information on when and where personnel and cargo will begin
loading, as well as guidance on the rotation of forces and equipment into and out of
theater (Newberry, 2005). Joint planners match service capabilities to these requirements
and link specific units, functions, and equipment to each plan.
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Units in ACC use their assigned OPLANs and CONPLANs for training and
exercise development. OPLANs and CONPLANs list specific mission sets, equipment,
personnel required, and deployment and phasing information for each plan. OPLANs
and CONPLANs also contain the operational and tactical level objectives and how these
objectives will be achieved through the integrated use of all service components (Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Newberry, 2005).
Air Force Deployment Process
Before 1990, AF units were tasked independent of each other and under multiple
commands, causing inconsistent deployment tempos and incomplete force packages
(Ross, 2012). In addition, assets deployed under multiple commanders caused competing
requirements. The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, created in the
1990s, logically organized AF assets into 10 force packages (McCullough, 2012). Force
packages paired component capabilities together, ensuring the effective utilization and
blend of assets required to complete the assigned mission. The AEF concept also
provided a stable and predictable deployment tempo for airmen (Secretary of the Air
Force, 2012). The 10 force packages deployed under the Air and Space Expeditionary
Task Force (AETF) construct. The “AETF presents a JFCC with a task-organized,
integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force
protection,” scalable to meet changing COCOM requirements and mission sets (United
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States Air Force, 2011). Equipment and personnel were assigned a unit type code (UTC)
which designated a specific capability. Force packages are comprised of UTCs
depending on the capabilities required3. Two force packages were always postured to
deploy while the remaining eight packages were in other stages of equipping/revitalizing,
training, preparing, or returning from deployment. Figure 3 shows the cycle of training,
preparing, deploying, and reintegration every force package went through. Prior to OIF
and OEF, the AEF concept fit well with the joint vision of rapid deployment and
integration.

Figure 3: AEF concept prior to surges in OEF and OIF

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however, stressed the AEF construct. The
original AEF concept was not designed to provide a long-term surge capability. To
quickly adapt, the AF converted to a tempo band system and dissolved the force package

3

Force packages are often referred to as “Buckets”. Two force packages filled one of five

buckets.
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concept. The tempo band system placed UTCs into one of five active duty tempo bands4.
The five tempo bands each had a different deploy-to-dwell ratio “based on the combatant
commander’s requirements” for that specific function (McCullough, 2012). Since UTCs
are capability based, the tempo band system created a situation where a single airman
could deploy. Individual augmentees often deployed in support of joint or coalition units,
filling a specific function (Ross, 2012).

Figure 4: AEF Tempo Band Construct

The next evolution of the AF deployment process is called AEF Next. It rebuilds
the old AEF process while addressing issues concerning surge capability, force

4

Reserve and Guard units follow their own specific tempo band construct due to differences in
Title 10 and Title 32 authorities (Figure 4) (Kapp & Torreon, 2013).
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packaging, teaming, and synchronization with Guard and Reserve forces. AEF Next
creates six air power teams based on the AF core functions. Each team includes all the
required units to satisfy that AF core function. Air power teams will be similar to Brigade
Combat Teams (BCT) or Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and thus easier to present
to JFCCs (Ross, 2012). Team integration is a big part of AEF Next and is designed to
allow air power teams to train and exercise together (McCullough, 2012) (Williams,
2013). Wings will now deploy as a complete package instead of a collection of
individual augmentees.

Summary
Chapter 2 presented the contextual information relevant to framing the main
hypothesis. Chapter 2 identified how the current AFIS system works and defined its
main goals: ensuring mission readiness and reducing risk. It also presented a logical
case for defining joint operations as a SoS and demonstrated how the AF already operates
within the SoS. Further, chapter 2 showed how the AF mission is focused on the success
of joint operations and ensuring integration and interoperability within the Joint SoS. It
presented several documents showing on the military’s evolution and how current
strategic level planning documents depict a future joint force more integrated and reliant
upon each other. Interoperability and flexibility will be attributes of this future force.
These conclusions carry forward into Chapters 3 and 4 helping provide background data
supporting the Units of Analysis (UOA) and solidifying the thesis position of overlaying
a joint SoS within the AFIS.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter focuses on the methodology used to answer the research question:
How should the AFIS be improved to account for the integrated nature of military
warfare reflective of a System-of-Systems architecture?
This question is answered in the following sections using a case study method.
Three embedded units of analysis help answer the main research question. UOA one
focuses on the integrative nature of military assets during combat operations and the risks
associated with joint operations. UOA two examines potential SoS metrics/attributes for
assessing joint readiness and how these can be applied within the current AFIS. UOA
three presents limitations or counter arguments to implementing joint SoS attributes into
the AFIS.
Figure 5 shows a representative diagram of the project’s design layout. The
dotted line represents the blurred boundary between context and the case study. This
distinction highlights the important role context plays in framing the case study. Case
studies focus on the operational links between events by connecting empirical and
contextual data to the main study question. The three UOAs and the main research
question embedded within the larger context box depicts this relationship.
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Figure 5: Case Study Design

Research Method Selection
According to Robert Yin, there are five methods from which to choose from when
conducting research (2012). Selecting the appropriate method aids in the development of
a research plan (Yin, 2009). Table 2 shows three conditions helpful in determining which
method to select.

31

Table 2: Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin, 2009)

Condition
Method
Experiment
Survey
Archival
Analysis

Form of
Research
Question

Requires Control
of Behavioral
Events

Focuses on
Contemporary
Events

How, why

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes/No

Who, What,
Where, How
many, How much
Who, What,
Where, How
many, How much

History

How, Why

No

No

Case Study

How, Why

No

Yes

A case study research paper presents the strongest method for three reasons.
First, the main research and investigative questions are “how” and “why” questions.
Second, the author cannot control the behavior of the AFIS. Third, the thesis focuses on
current events. Another reason for using the case study research method is when the
links between supporting data and the main study questions are too complex to capture in
surveys or controlled experiments. Robert Yin explains, “You use the case study method
because you wanted to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, but such
understanding encompassed important contextual conditions – because they were highly
pertinent to your phenomenon of study” (2009).

Unit of Analysis Examination
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This thesis has three embedded UOAs as depicted in Figure 5. Each UOA is its
own case study and thus may use any or a combination of the five research methods
presented in Table 2 (Yin, 2012). This is a key principle of case study research, helping
create a larger pool of corroborative data, collected from multiple sources, converging on
ideas or facts that directly support the main hypothesis (Yin, 2009). A large triangulating
pool of data helps solidify the research, validates the hypothesis, and dispels one of the
leading prejudices against case study research; lack of academic rigor (Yin, 2009).
Figure 6 provides a pictorial diagram of convergent data and also reflects how each UOA
acts as its own case study.

Figure 6: Convergent analysis validates research hypothesis

Unit of Analysis 1 – Integrative Nature of Joint Military Systems
UOA 1: The integrative nature of military assets during combat operations and
the risks associated with joint operations.
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UOA 1 focuses on four of the investigative questions:
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations?
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system?
3. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of
military assets during operations?
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation
to an operational readiness inspection?
Chapter 4 presents observations from joint operations and large force exercises.
These observations, along with context from joint planning documents, will frame US
military operations as joint in nature, reliant on the synergistic effects of the service
branches to wage and win wars. High-level strategic documents also emphasize the need
for joint operations to become even more integrated in the future. The trend toward
further integration creates areas of additional risk. These areas must be addressed now in
preparation for the future. Current AFIS evaluations should frame inspections within the
joint SoS in order to identify and reduce integration-associated risks. This UOA will
blend case study and archival methods.
Unit of Analysis 2 – Joint Readiness Assessment and Metrics
UOA 2: Potential system of systems metrics/attributes for assessing joint
readiness and how these can be applied within the context of the AFIS.
UOA 2 focuses on analyzing two of five investigative questions:
1. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation
to an operational readiness inspection?
2. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and
determine the status and health of ACC units?
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This UOA examines ways to apply the AFIS to preexisting resources and
environments better representative of the Joint SoS. UOA 2 also studies several
metrics/attributes inherent in joint operations, which should be added to the AFIS
checklists. Primarily a case study, UOA 2 addresses how and why these additions/
modifications are necessary and what they provide. This UOA demonstrates how
realigning the AFIS provides better evidence of a unit’s combat readiness.
Unit of Analysis 3 – Limitation of the SoS approach
UOA 3: Limitations or counter arguments to implementing joint SoS attributes
into the AFIS.
This UOA focuses on identifying areas of concern regarding implementing a joint
SoS architecture. As such, UOA 3 helps answer three of the investigative questions.
1. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system?
2. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of
military assets during operations?
3. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation
to an operational readiness inspection?
According to Yin, identifying and acknowledging weaknesses or differencing
opinions are an essential part of case study research, providing the author an opportunity
to refute each case. Counter arguments for each of these concerns are also addressed in
UOA 3.

Sources
The concept of applying a joint SoS architecture to the AFIS finds support in
academia, national strategy documents, and the DoD. However, to fully support the
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academic resources and defend the hypothesis required input and feedback from Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs). Their insights provided further areas to research as well as
provided critical analysis on the applicability and necessity for implementing a change
gained over their AF careers. SMEs ranged from personnel on the ACC staff, primarily
within the A2 and A3 directorates, with over 20 years of experience including
assignments as group and wing CCs. Deputy Directors, SESs, division chiefs, branch
chiefs, and other staff personnel with direct experience interacting with wing personnel as
well as past assignments at wing, group, and squadron levels also contributed inputs.
Members of the ACC/IG also reviewed and provided thoughts and comments on this
work. Several members of the ACC staff had past joint experiences, either from staff
assignments or deployments. Wing/CC’s from multiple bases contributed thoughts and
ideas as well. Engagements with O-3s to O-5s, from multiple Air Force Specialty Codes
(AFSC), across ACC, Air Force Material Command (AFMC), Air Mobility Command
(AMC), AF Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and US AF Europe (USAFE),
added perspectives from those currently implementing the AFIS and CCIPs. This diverse
field of SMEs totaling approximately 100 personnel lends credibility to this research.

Summary
Chapter 3 presented a road map for answering the hypothesis using a case study
methodology. It described the techniques for analyzing each UOA and what
methodology will be used. Chapter 4 presents the analysis and results of these three
UOAs.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
Chapter 4 explores each UOA in greater depth providing examples and dialogue
to support the hypothesis. Chapter 4 is divided into three sections based on the UOAs.
Section one describes critical weaknesses in how the AFIS evaluates wing readiness in a
joint context. Section two investigates ways to enhance the AFIS using joint
characteristics. Section two also covers current resources available to help implement a
joint SoS within the AFIS. Section three addresses opposing viewpoints or flaws in
implementing a joint SoS inspection.

Findings: Unit of Analysis 1 – Integrative Nature of Joint Military Systems
Since the colonial campaigns of 1776 leading up to 1986, all US military
operations attempted to achieve a successful joint force. In 1986, as a result of failed
military operations from 1950 to 1983, Congress ordered sweeping organizational and
climate changes across the DoD. The Goldwater Nichols Act transformed the DoD,
acknowledging that successful operations required the synchronized and combined
effects of all military departments working as single force. The acts two primary changes
established the IG as an independent evaluator and organized the war fighting chain of
command under a single unified CC.
JP 1-02 defines interoperability as “the ability to operate in synergy in the
execution of assigned tasks” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). In 2008, JP 1-02 defined
interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
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services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008). This later definition

more precisely defines interoperability as an exchange between entities to increase
efficiencies and implies a level of integration. General Martin Dempsey recently stated
US armed forces continue to make substantial improvements in their ability to conduct
joint operations; however, he noted two areas of concerns. First, he stated US forces
must continue to work together to advance joint capabilities, as future conflicts will
require further integration to achieve success. Second, “each [speaking of Operations
Desert Storm, OEF, and OIF] has further highlighted requirements for a system to
effectively measure, assess, and report readiness from a joint perspective” (Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). General Dempsey’s words reemphasize the hypothesis;
specifically, that combat readiness should be assessed inside the joint SoS architecture.
Air Combat Command Staff Perspectives
Figure 7 depicts an illustrative joint operations OV-1 diagram. The picture shows
the integrated and reliant nature of service components in an operational environment. It
displays multiple levels of interoperability creating the synergistic effects referred to by
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the CJCS. Discussions with ACC staff personnel5 helped identify key differences
between joint warfare, as depicted in Figure 7 and a single wing inspection system.

Figure 7: Operation view of the joint environment (SAF/CIO A6, 2010)

A primary aspect unique to joint operations is the sharing of information across
platforms and services. This crucial element of modern warfare helps find, locate, and
exploit enemy weaknesses. Information sharing drives the development of future
operational and tactical level missions and decision planning as well as builds a common

5

ACC Staff personnel refers to member of the ACC/A2 and A3 staffs, including Branch Chiefs,
Division Chiefs, SESs, and Directors of Operations.
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operating picture for all users and enhances situational awareness. Additionally,
information sharing requires three primary elements.
1) The gathering equipment must be able to send the data.
2) The receiving equipment must be able to accept and process the information.
3) The users on both ends must know what to do with the information.
Missing any one of these elements degrades the utility of the information. In joint
operations, information is everywhere. Finding the right information and passing it along
to the correct user(s) are important functions of all deployed personnel.
The characteristics of joint leadership, timing, and weapon system relationships
are also demonstrated in Figure 7. Based on the number of connections between
platforms, leaders must understand their role in the grand scheme as well as other
responsibilities they may assume. Leaders must also be aware of which organizations are
depending on them to successful complete their assigned mission. According to ACC
staff, the diagram also reveals the amount of risk leaders assume when it comes to
implementing the mission and assigning personnel and equipment. They must constantly
balance the safety and security of their personnel and equipment versus the requirements
to complete the mission. Leadership characteristics at this level are difficult to assess
outside the joint SoS.
ACC staff personnel commented that organization provides a level of structure by
establishing a chain of command. Creating a well-organized operation ensures
information flows smoothly and helps personnel build and maintain situational
awareness. Joint operations, because of the mix of services, coalition partners, and
outside agencies, present a larger organizational problem. CCs must decipher these
40

larger often overlapping organizational rings within joint operations to ensure the timely
dissemination of information to the right personnel. Conversely, the organizational
structure within most ACC wings is simpler in size, scope, and geography.
The relationship between weapon systems deals with the role of supporting versus
supported. In joint operations personnel must know not only their platform’s capabilities
and limitations but also those of other platforms involved. The relationship between
platforms explains who is leading the operation and the operation’s primary goal.
Understanding these connections contributes to mission success.
All these elements (information sharing, leadership, organization, and weapon
system relationships) are linked together in the joint environment and their effects are
often compounded by distance. In a joint environment a Wing/CC must juggle all these
elements simultaneously. It is difficult to evaluate these elements during single wing
inspection as they are often mitigated, simulated, or not applied.
ACC staff members pointed out there is no standard for joint preparation or joint
integration. While joint publications and AFIs provide guidance and direction, there
remains room for interpretation. There is a lack of clear guidance on what joint means at
the wing level and who monitors adherence to JPs. They readily identified a lack of joint
training opportunities, command level guidance, and oversight to help mitigate this
problem. Compounding this issue, staff members mentioned every Wing/CC organizes
and trains his/her unit based on past experiences. These unique career experiences create
different interpretations of already loosely defined regulations directing affecting how
wings practice, prepare, and equip. Compounded just across AF wings, these differences
create integration issues during joint operations.
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The ACC staff provided several notable differences in how a single wing OV-1
looks versus the joint operational OV-1 depicted in Figure 7. A wing level inspection
under evaluates, or neglects several of the previously mentioned joint characteristics.
Wing level inspections are introspective, focusing on areas within the Wing/CC’s
purview. Wing exercises and inspections often simulate outside relationships.
Communication and information flow is much shorter and does not feed a larger
organization. The negative implications of missed communications, actions, or plans do
not ripple outward. Further, there is not a leadership role to practice mitigating these
implications. During wing evaluations, distance also does not become factor. Everything
necessary to complete their mission, the wing has at their disposal. There are limited
ways to test interoperability and integration during wing exercises. Reliance on others is
reduced and thus the pressures to perform, act, or accept risks are not present.
Risk Analysis: The Diamond Model
The previous discussions with ACC staff members highlights several differences
between joint operations and single wing inspections. These differences present known
levels of risks. Modifying an approach designed to assess project management risk
provides insight into the differences between joint operations and single wing
inspections. The diamond model approach created by Shenhar and Dvir helps managers
scope their project and select the appropriate managerial techniques to maximize benefits
and reduce risk (2007). Analysis occurs using a radar chart with four dimensions.
Linking the plotted values from each dimension creates a graphical representation of the
uncertainty and risk inherent in a project. See Figure 8 through Figure 10 for examples.
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The four dimensions are listed in Table 3 along with abbreviated definitions (Shenhar &
Dvir, 2007). Appendix B provides additional information on the diamond technique.
Table 3: Diamond Method dimensions and definitions

Dimension

Definition

Novelty
How new is the
product,
familiarity with
the product.
Represents the
uncertainty of
the projects goal

Technology
Technology and
task uncertainty.
The level of
technology
needed or used
in the project

Complexity
Scope. Project
organization.
What is the
project task

Pace
Urgency,
impacts
autonomy,
decision
making, and
management
involvement.
Affects planning

While not specifically designed to identify risks associated with military
operations, Shenhar and Dvir’s approach to analyzing project management risk is
applicable to this study. In fact, military operations contain similar attributes to projects.
In addition, military operations are planned and coordinated in a comparable fashion to
tangible project development. A JFC acts as the project lead, assembling the required
parts, pieces, and people to complete the mission. The JFC balances requirements, time,
sizing, costs, and integration like any project manager. In this analogy, the operation is
the project. Once complete, the JFC is tasked with another project. Operations, like
projects, can affect, influence, or run in parallel with other operations and require
additional oversight to resolve disputes and set priorities. In the case of military
operations, the COCOM, SECDEF, and POTUS act as chief executive officers
delineating responsibilities and managing the oversight of all operations. The DoD’s use
of the terminology “systems of systems” in reference to the military implies a project like
structure (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008). Similar to integration and interoperability issues
during joint operations hinders mission success, Shenhar and Dvir write that a “complex
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system does not simply function as a collection of subsystems…even when all
subsystems function perfectly and each one fully meets specifications, when they are put
together they rarely work as a system the first time. Ignoring this reality may cause
delays and surprises to project managers” (2007). The similarities between military
operations management and project management allow the application of Shenhar and
Dvir’s diamond approach to military operations.
The next paragraphs provide further discussion on the four dimensions listed in
Table 3 and offer examples to illustrate each one.
Novelty relates to the type of military operation as defined by JP 3-0. This
dimension also includes geographical location and level of warfare, with the later
referring to the type of environment faced by our forces. This includes permissive, nonpermissive, anti-access, aerial denial, and chemical environments. These factors change
the operations novelty as they represent environments US forces do not routinely prepare
for. The Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations of OEF and OIF, for example, would
represent a breakthrough level of novelty form of warfare for US forces. Prior to OEF
and OIF, the US military had not participated in or practiced a “hearts and minds”
approach to COIN operations. This new COIN approach emphasized winning over the
population as a way to drive out terrorist and reduce insurgent activity.
Table 4: Types of Military Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011)

Examples of Military Operations
Stability operations

Combating weapons
of mass destruction

Recovery

44

Counterdrug
operations

Civil support

Noncombatant
evacuation

Chemical, biological,
radiological, and
nuclear consequence
management

Foreign
humanitarian
assistance

Peace Operations

Foreign internal
defense

Combating terrorism

Homeland defense

Technology relates to the type of equipment being used in support of the
operation. This dimension includes the communication, space, and cyber architecture as
well as conventional equipment (planes, tanks, bombs). The OV-1 diagram depicted in
Figure 7 shows the complex technology required to ensure all forces can communicate
and complete their assigned missions. A surgical SEAL operation however, may use less
technology to control emissions and allow for speed, security, and stealth (Carney &
Schemmer, 2002).
Complexity focuses on the operations size, strategy, scope, and command
architecture. It also includes components of distance and logistical support. Coalition
warfare increases the level of complexity.
Pace refers to speed and duration and is driven by the type of operation. Most
military operations require timely movements in order to meet TPFDD deployment
timelines or execute a new Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle. A humanitarian operation
may require the rapid deployment of forces, whereas the buildup for Operation Desert
Storm was deliberate and occurred over a six-month span. The unit’s primary mission
capability also dictates pace. Personnel recovery (PR) units may exercise at a blitz pace
in order to save lives. Fighter operations however, may fall more in the fast/competitive
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lane for regular ATO execution but spike to time critical or blitz if called to support a
Troops-in-Contact (TIC) or PR event.
The subsequent paragraphs apply the diamond approach to single wing exercises
and joint operations. According to the AFI 90-201, inspection readiness reflects mission
readiness. If true, the wing and joint diamonds should be relatively similar in size.
Shenhar and Dvir state inaccurately sizing a project’s diamond indicates a lack of project
understanding/analysis. This causes waste, if sized too large, or increased risk, delays,
and cost, if undersized (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). The diamond’s area reflects the project’s
overall risk and complexity (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). The difference in area between the
wing and joint diamonds reflects the additional complexity inherent in joint operations,
not captured in wing level exercises. The size difference translates to additional risk
wings may face when deploying in support of joint operations. The resulting diamonds
were sized by the author using his military experiences as a project manager for
acquisition programs, multiple deployments as an intelligence officer and civil engineer,
time in wing level intelligence organizations, and the flight commander for ACC’s Staff
Assistance Visit (SAV) program. In addition, the experiences and knowledge of ACC
personnel, listed in the Sources section, contributed to how to plot each diamond.
Application of the Diamond Model to a Wing Exercise
Figure 8 depicts the risk associated with a wing level inspection or exercise.
Since the majority of wing level exercises are internally focused, the novelty can be
considered derivative in nature. Wing level exercises are often derivatives of prior
exercises with updated intelligence, geopolitical, and TTP information. Completely new
exercises scenarios are rarely generated at the wing level. Given the number of base
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organizations involved in these exercises the complexity level fits the description of a
system. Routinely scenarios become focused on specific functions within the wing,
limiting base involvement to as few units as necessary. This minimization, along with
the repetitive use of similar scenarios, limits the size of the complexity and novelty
dimensions. Technology risk remains at the low to medium level.

Figure 8: Wing level risk assessment

While several wing organizations work together creating a larger pool of technology
required to synchronize communications and share data, there is rarely new technology
integrated into wing scenarios. Wing scenarios look to refine already existing
capabilities and identify inefficiencies. However, it is possible for newer technology to
be incorporated to correct past deficiencies, which is captured in the slight increase
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towards medium technology. In addition, the platform itself affects the size of the
technology dimension. ISR platforms, for example, often require larger communications
networks. Wing exercises often limit the network requirement though, simulating
communication and information sharing with outside organizations. Pace is the only
dimension identical between wing and joint operations.
Application of the Diamond Model to joint operations
Figure 9 shows a diamond model assessment of a joint operation or exercise.
Joint operations stretch outward in three of the four dimensions compared to a single
wing inspection. Figure 10 in the next section shows a comparison of the single wing
versus joint diamonds, overlaying the one over top the other.
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Figure 9: Joint risk assessment

Analyzing the novelty dimension for joint operations creates an area between
platform and breakthrough. At a minimum, joint operations start at the platform level.
As discussed in chapter two, JFCs build and tailor forces to meet current operational
needs. Each JFC acts as a new platform. However, the changing global environment,
rising global powers, the rapid proliferation of technology, advanced Surface to Air
Missiles (SAMs) and jammers, and the increasing number of terrorist organizations,
creates an endless number of scenarios joint forces must be prepared to handle. Future
operations will challenge US forces in new ways. The unknown nature of the next
conflict extends the novelty dimension out to breakthrough. Joint exercises are often
conducted at the platform level, expanding upon already used exercises to incorporate
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new weapon systems or expand the focus of the exercise to incorporate new threat
environments.
The technology risk associated with joint operations ranges from high tech to
super high tech. The integration of service and/or coalition technology resembles the
definition of high tech and sets the minimum level of risk. The “fog and friction” of
warfare accounts for the increase from high to super-high-tech. Integration and
interoperability issues may drive the development of new technology or require the quick
adaptation of existing technology. In addition, warfare is the struggle between
adversaries to achieve conflicting goals. The struggle to gain and maintain momentum,
exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, and defend ones gains, spurs the development of new
technology and TTPs in order to gain a slight advantage. The rapid development of
networked and layered sensor and communication systems transformed OEF and OIF
into super high tech wars.
The complexity risk associated with joint operations primarily resides at the array
level. Shenhar and Dvir define an array as a SoS or “a widely dispersed collection of
systems that function together to achieve a common purpose” (2007). This definition is
exactly how joint and coalition forces operate. The challenge of merging and organizing
several command structures under one unified CC poses a large risk. Several other
factors affect complexity risk. Ensuring all services work to achieve a single goal,
balancing various Rules of Engagements (ROEs), understanding the strengths and
limitations of each service or coalition partner, and managing a global logistics chain are
a few examples.
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Comparison of Wing and Joint risks
Figure 10 shows the joint and wing diamonds plotted on the same graph. Joint
operations incorporate a larger amount of risk in three of the four dimensions. Only the
pace dimension is the same for joint and wing operations. The added area of the joint
diamond represents shortfalls and unidentified risks in single wing inspections. The
smaller wing diamond explains the “start-up pains” and additional issues several ACC
staff and wing personnel mentioned earlier. A puzzle analogy works well to describe the
differences. The POTUS has a vision, which the SECDEF in turn creates into a picture.
The COCOMs cuts up the puzzle as they see fit with a single piece representing a wing.
People only put puzzles together when they want to. No one counts the pieces or sorts
them before starting. It’s halfway through the puzzle when someone realizes pieces are
missing, finds pieces from another puzzle, or notices the pieces don’t fit together
anymore. The combined effect of all the pieces is a perfect recreation of the POTUS’s
vision. Missing just one-piece flaws the entire image.
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Figure 10: Overlay of Joint and Single Wing risk assessment models

ACC staff also equated the size difference between the joint and single wing
diamonds to the introverted nature of wings. When at home station, wings tend to focus
on improving internal functions and procedures. Their training focuses on the specific
tasks assigned in their OPLANs and CONPLANS. In today’s fiscally constrained
environment ACC staff does not see wing commands spending funds on large force
exercises or joint training when money may not even be available to sustain current
flying operations or maintenance costs. All agreed the smaller defense budget has the
potential to make the differences in joint and wing diamonds larger as Wing/CCs
prioritize necessities first.
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Some argued the new AFIS will also create a larger difference between joint and
wing operations. Since the new AFIS evaluates the CC’s ability to lead and manage his
own inspection program, they felt CCs would concentrate more on internal issues verses
external connections. This inward looking perspective further separates wings from the
larger joint SoS as commanders put all their resources towards correcting internal issues
while ignoring areas with cross wing or service implications.
Operational Wing Personnel Perspectives
Discussions with unit personnel concurred with the ACC staff perspectives of
joint versus AFIS realities. Conversations included pilots, maintainers, and intelligence
personnel from the following platforms: RC-135, JSTARS, Global Hawk,
Predator/Reaper, ASOS, F-16, C-130, AWACS, and F-15E. All personnel agreed that
large-scale exercises provided better evaluations of combat readiness. Wing personnel
concurred with ACC staff members that wing exercises6 often simulate key operational
components. Further, personnel noted wing exercises do not provide opportunities to
conduct operations with other service air or ground assets. Lacking these elements makes
it difficult to correctly assess wing readiness or adequately prepare for joint operations.
Examples provided included synchronizing timing with other units, joint mission
planning and rehearsal, and direct interaction with ground control, airborne control, and

6

Wing exercises are often referred to as operational readiness exercises (ORE) or ORIs
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ISR platforms. Other differences noted included lack of realistic scenarios and the
inability to test equipment across networks. Most personnel stated they experienced
varying degrees of interoperability issues throughout their deployment. Initial integration
issues were identified as a large problem. Overtime, personnel noted issues became
smaller; however, the dynamic nature of operations sometimes caused new issues or
further complicated others.
An example from several ISR wing inspections, under the current and old AFIS,
provides insight into the limitations of single wing inspections. During wing exercises
and inspections, personnel revealed ISR aircraft often do not conduct live or simulated
operations. The aircraft take off in order to demonstrate the capability to generate sorties
however, there is often no mission to test/demonstrate the platform’s ISR capability.
Personnel cited time, money, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restrictions,
planning constraints, and leadership as reasons why this occurs. In addition, personnel
stated simulators (which can be linked to live or virtual exercises) are outdated and do not
provide the same fidelity as actual missions. Simulator availability was also identified as
an issue. Some wings have noted these deficiencies using the new CCIP; however, others
did not. When asked why, several personnel stated the higher deployment tempo for ISR
platforms keeps personnel well trained. This statement independently validates the
hypothesis. Units are using real operations as training environments, relying on the
larger SoS to provide the necessary realism.
Many aircrew and intelligence personnel stated Large Force Exercises (LFE)
provided better feedback on wing readiness. LFEs place an emphasis on successful
integration in order to achieve mission objectives. LFEs act as a venue for testing and
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refining TTPs or Concept of Operations (CONOP), reducing integration risk by
identifying areas of concern prior to deployment. LFEs mirror combat operations by
generating scenarios that require units to interact and integrate in order to achieve
mission success. Combat operations place importance on synchronizing effects to ensure
mission completion. In contrast, internal wing inspections often place the emphasis on
procedures. JP 1-02’s definition of interoperability, given earlier, reiterates this point.
LFEs provide a platform to resolve cross service issues at the lowest level. However,
several personnel mentioned issues such as conflicting TTPs, network/communications
problems, and logistics/planning differences regularly emerge during LFEs (or during
joint deployments). Sometimes, these issues transcend the wing level and permeate
throughout the AF and other services. In these situations, an IG focused and trained to
understand the larger SoS could use its position to benefit all branches. As an
independent evaluator, the IG’s access to higher-level CCs would allow the quick
resolution of interoperability issues.
ACC staff members and personnel were asked to identify reasons why the current
AFIS conducts single wing inspections and what benefits exist to this method. The
primary reason identified for single wing inspections was simplicity. Single wing
inspections reduce the required number of inspectors. Inspecting multiple wings
simultaneously requires additional resources to ensure the availability of enough
inspectors for each location. In addition, a single wing inspection provides a simple
method for identifying the source of problems and assigning responsibility. In addition,
most wings identify themselves as having a unique mission, making it impossible to
equally compare results. Inspecting a single wing allows the IG to tailor its needs and
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checklists for each wing to accommodate the variety of unit missions. During
conversations with the IG, they agreed with all these points. They added single wing
inspections also make trend analysis easy, allowing quick publication of corrective
guidance.
Collaborating Field Research and Data
A 2011 survey of active duty intelligence units in ACC supports the staff and
wing personnel’s thoughts on the lack of joint training opportunities. Among other
questions, the survey asked units to report on pre-deployment training specific to the
wing’s deployed function and theater specific spin up training. Findings revealed that on
average only two percent of wing intelligence personnel were funded to attend focused
pre-deployment training (15th Intel Squadron, 2011). Thirty five percent of wings said
spin up training was adequate at best (fifty five percent had no comment). Only forty one
percent felt their units were prepared to accomplish the deployed mission. The report
noted that at one time ACC offered a pre-deployment/theater spin up course that provided
units with specific training on current TTPs employed down range (15th Intel Squadron,
2011). The course used a feedback loop to ensure units had the latest information before
leaving the US. The report did not mention when and why the course was canceled
however, it did mention the course stopped prior to this survey (15th Intel Squadron,
2011).
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports over the past two decades
support ACC’s findings, identifying the lack of joint training opportunities as a primary
cause for integration and interoperability issues (1992) (1998) (2005). In 2009, the DoD
published DoD Directive 1322.18, requiring all training be built around “an open, net
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centric, interoperable standard” focused on meeting COCOM requirements (Department
of Defense, 2009). The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board echoed the GAO findings in
a 2005 report stating the lack of joint SoS planning, preparation, and training created
situations in which “the unanticipated need for system to system interactions too often
require clever ad hoc work-arounds” (2005). Further, the 2005 report listed four
battlefield consequences created by a lack of joint SoS planning: “1) JFCs cannot take
full advantage of assets, 2) capabilities are ‘late to the need’, 3) unanticipated CONOPS
‘work-arounds’ developed on the fly, and 4) users had to compensate for weak
interoperability designs” (United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board).
While training and LFEs can help correct deficiencies in interoperability and
integration, an inspection system must be in place to enforce standards. Training
programs require evaluations to provide feedback on the program’s quality and accuracy.
In addition, evaluations ensure personnel are proficient at their assigned tasks. AFIs 11202 and 14-202 (aircrew and intelligence regulations respectively) each contain three
volumes. Volume one of each series is dedicated to training. Volume two is dedicated to
standardization and evaluation and ensuring the training program meets all expectations.
The IG is ACC’s evaluator and is responsible for identifying and addressing these larger
issues of interoperability and integration.
Research in the area of battlefield fratricide shows a direct connection between
the causes of fratricide and service branches failing to acknowledge the larger joint
context during training, exercises, and planning. This failure leads to increased risk
which could be mitigated through a joint SoS approach to inspections. A study by Hewitt
and Webb from the United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL)
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linked fratricide to several of the factors identified by ACC staff members and personnel.
Their research shows an increase in the percentage of fratricide events since WWI. The
cases they analyzed involved several cross service incidents (example: AF pilots fire on
Army personnel). The level and complexity of warfare, and a heavy reliance on
technology, were identified as two underlying forces attributing to the increased fratricide
rate, but not the sole reasons (Hewett & Webb, 2010). The most common causes of
fratricide were related to three categories. First, misidentification which included three
related findings: “combat identification measures, the actions of the target, and the
physical features of the target” (Hewett & Webb, 2010). Categories two and three were
teamwork and procedures respectively. Training was identified as a common factor
related to these three categories. In their conclusion, Hewett and Webb recommended
military leaders “should stress the importance of training, education, and leadership,” in
order to combat fratricide (2010). They further noted the heavy dependence on
technology created an air of overconfidence in abilities. This overconfidence often
prevented soldiers from “double checking plans,” and reduced information sharing
(Hewett & Webb, 2010).
A separate study conducted by Gadsden and Outteridge came to similar
conclusions. Their root cause analysis identified the top four reasons as communication
and information flow, Command and Control (C2), procedures, and misidentification
(Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006). Reliance on technology was identified as a minor
contributing factor. Gadsden and Outteridge concluded there is never a single reason for
a fratricide event. Instead, the compilation of several factors resulting in a loss of
situational awareness is the most likely cause (Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006). The
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compilation of factors equates to the compounding effect of risks. Gadsden and
Outteridge did not specify ways to resolve these issues; however, since the results are
similar to Hewett and Webb’s work, better training and preparation are potential
solutions.
Major Russell Hart in 2004 and Commander Robert Rasmussen in 2007 published
similar qualitative studies on the increasing percentage of fratricide cases. Their articles
share similar thoughts on the rapid pace of modern conflict and its impact on human
factors and the reliance of forces on technology (Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen, 2007).
According to Hart and Rasmussen, the dynamic nature of modern warfare creates
situations where “the mission that forces may be tasked to accomplish and the manner in
which they may be employed may not necessarily coincide with the dedicated mission
the specific unit or asset was intended to perform” (Hart, 2004). Maj Hart provides the
example of B-52’s conducting Close Air Support (CAS) in the early stages of OEF and
OIF, a role “strategic bombers had not played since Vietnam (Hart, 2004).” Several of
these non-traditional combat roles resulted in fratricide or near missing. New TTPs and
safety regulations were written after such events occurred (Rasmussen, 2007). Army and
Air Force top officials immediately pushed for implementing these new TTPs and
regulations into joint training and exercises. Both authors state they feel more joint
exercises and training would have the greatest effect on reducing fratricide. Exercises
and training events highlight areas of incompatibility and allow the development and
writing of TTPs and regulations prior to combat operations (Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen,
2007). Further, both cite the high ops tempo forcing soldiers to rely more heavily on
technology to build Situational Awareness (SA). Hart and Rasmussen pointed to the lack
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of compatibility between several identify friend or foe and blue force tracking systems
currently in use, citing soldiers heavily relied on this technology to be true at all times
(Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen, 2007). Miss-identification was cited as a primary reason for
fratricide in both reports as well as being identified in Gadsden and Outteridge’s and
Hewitt and Webb’s works (although not a prime reason in either case). Hart’s and
Rasmussen’s stories on the overuse of technology also relates to Hewett and Webb’s
overconfidence factor. An incomplete picture of the battlefield compounds the problems
created by a lack of joint awareness/training.
The qualitative and quantitative examples of the previous paragraphs show the
need for early integration of forces at the lowest levels in order to help reduce combat
risk. Factors identified in these studies on fratricide complement discussion with ACC
staff and personnel and explain the larger joint operational risk diamond. Joint training,
operations, and exercises demonstrate levels of increased risk due to the added
complexity and pace of warfare. Joint forces rely on each other to provide specific
capabilities to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical level operations. Inherent in
that trust is the mutual understanding of TTPs, guidance, regulations, and a refined
practice. A major component of the UEI though is to assess and identify wing level risks
which could impede combat readiness with the goal of shrinking the difference between
combat and inspection ready. A SoS perspective layered over the AFIS should identify
additional joint risks prior to deployments, allowing for the development and
implementation of risk mitigation strategies/plans.
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Deployment Findings
A recent deployment supporting MC-12 operations in Southeast Asia reiterates
several of the points identified by staff and wing personnel.
In the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations, the Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) annex to the ATO lists all the ISR
sensors’ taskings for a specific day. The process to develop the RSTA and the
information it contains highlights the integrated nature of modern warfare. To request
ISR support for upcoming operations, units submit requests through collection managers.
Collection managers translate requests into requirements. These requirements are input
into a database where the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB) sorts and
prioritizes the requirements. The JCMB provides the prioritized list to the Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC) where a team assigns an ISR sensor to fulfill the requirement.
The RSTA provides baseline information for who, what, when, where, and how each
sensor will support operations. Units use the RSTA to gather additional mission details
through direct contact with supported users and other agencies. This decentralized
execution allows assigned platforms flexibility to properly support its customer at the
right time and place.
Interoperability issues often arise as a result of the RSTA. This process normally
assigns an AF platform to support a non-AF unit. A lack of understanding in capabilities,
TTPs, and responsibilities between the two users impedes mission success. The MC-12
MULTI-INT aircraft is a prime example. The majority of MC-12 missions fly in support
of US Army or Marine ground forces. Ground CCs were often not familiar with the MC12 platform or its capabilities. Lacking this knowledge, many ground units under or
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incorrectly utilized the MC-12. In addition, AF pilots lacked the required training to read
ground schemes of maneuver, making permission planning and coordination difficult.
The MC-12 wing started a liaison program to educate ground forces on the platform’s
capabilities. This along with post mission debriefs with supported users helped mitigate
integration issues.
Further, MC-12 aircrews were authorized to provide air warden duties for large
ground operations. This role required MC-12 crewmembers to manage and direct all
aircraft supporting an operation. Mission CCs cross-talked with all participating air
assets, relaying commands from ground force and vice versa. Only mission CCs holding
current air warden certifications were authorized to perform this duty. Home station
training; however, lacked the resources to provide this certification before a mission
commander deployed. The home station training program did not have a robust enough
scenario to accomplish this task. Once deployed, mission CCs received training “on the
fly” during actual missions in order to receive their air warden certification.
The MC-12 also provided buddying lasing for strike aircraft to fire guided
munitions. Similar to air warden certification, MC-12 operators received training down
range during actual combat missions. Never trained in munitions planning, the lack of
knowledge on weapons effects hindered operations. MC-12 personnel were not familiar
with important considerations to ensure successful target engagement. Details
concerning run in headings and release angles to mitigate Collateral Damage Estimates
(CDE) or provide the strike platform a better visual on the target were new subjects for
MC-12 operators. Joint exercises on military ranges in theater established the buddying
lasing TTPs and certification requirements.
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Another adjunct role provided by the MC-12 was medical evacuation relay.
Ground forces encountering communications issues due to distance, equipment failure,
frequency differences, or jamming sometimes could not communicate their requirement
for medical support. Or once in route, ground forces would not know the callsign and
frequency on which to communicate the medical platform. MC-12 aircrew became radio
relay assets during these situations, passing 9 line information as well as situational
updates and possible threats to inbound rescue platforms. During TTP development
(again conducted in the deployed environment), ground personnel explained that during
homestation exercises, air lift is simulated and all the callsign and frequency information
is provided beforehand. In addition, many ground units never simulated or practiced
procedures to mitigate jamming or work around other communication issues.
Inspecting MC-12 mission capability requires testing aircrew proficiency in all
mission areas. Many of these situations are difficult to test or capture in a single wing
inspection. The only way to assess mission capability in today’s joint environment is to
evaluate a system within the joint SoS architecture.
Further research revealed two similar integration issues. Air to ground fighter
units often deploy with an embedded Army Ground Liaison Officer (GLO). This
position, as well as those at Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) sites, was
intended to increase interoperability and reduce operational risks between services.
Coordination and communication issues between AF and Army personnel resulting in
impaired operations highlighted the need to provide inter-service liaisons (i.e. translate
Army talk to AF language and vice versa). Army liaisons facilitate cross talk between
aircrew, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), and ground forces CCs, interpret
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CONOPS/Scheme of Manuevers (SoM), support mission planning, and provide
awareness training to AF personnel. The DCGS utilizes Naval Intelligence personnel for
the same reason. These issues and their solutions were identified and tested during LFEs
or combat operations.

Findings: Unit of Analysis 2 – Joint Readiness Assessment and Metrics
Integrating a joint SoS architecture into the current AFIS does not require a
completely new system. The framework shown in Figure 1 provides a good foundation
while already existing capabilities can be leveraged to make integration smoother and
quicker. Implementing a joint SoS in the AFIS provides a means for breaking down
barriers related to interoperability and expanding upon the IG’s current function of
identifying risk and ensuring combat readiness. The IG as an independent organization
can reach across services to identify root causes impacting joint operations and driving
change. Further, expanding the AFIS aperture to include the joint SoS creates an
organization capturing lessons learned and studying growing trends to potentially identify
areas of future risk. General Hostage, ACC/CC, summarized the importance of joint
interoperability stating, “Partnerships improve operational effectiveness and increase
integration of air force, joint, allied, and coalition capabilities in advanced threat
environments” (Hostage, 2014).
Joint Characteristics
This section collects and expands upon the joint characteristics mentioned
throughout this work. It should be acknowledged that these are not “new” characteristics
by any means but have been pulled from joint and AF regulations as well as from articles
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by other government agencies/think tanks and non-government organizations from as
early as 1987. While some of these documents contained additional characteristics, all
stated the need for a more integrated and interoperable, rapidly deployed and tailored
forces, which can easily “plug and play” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003). Discussions with
the personnel listed in the Sources section helped limit this list to four characteristics: 1)
Rapid integration, 2) Rapid interoperability, 3) Joint training, 4) Flexibility/adaptability.
Additional characteristics mentioned where: 1) Rapid mobility, 2) Net-centric, 3)
Tailored, and 4) Joint awareness. Rapid mobility and net-centric were combined with the
definitions for rapid integration and interoperability while joint awareness was combined
with joint training. Tailored was eliminated from the list since it is the JFCC’s job to
decide which forces he/she requires to complete the mission.
In addition to implementing these characteristics within the IG checklist, the joint
SoS architecture requires a mindset change in ACC wings. Personnel must begin to
acknowledge the relationship between units and the joint SoS and the affects each
component has on the other. The mindset shift affects wing TTPs, decision-making, and
planning; however, adopting the joint SoS architecture aligns with the intended focus of
the UEI and the force with combat readiness.
Adapting Figure 1, Figure 11 shows how the joint architecture would integrate
with the current UEI MGAs. Adding the characteristics does not require changing the
UEI rating system, which assigns each MGA an equal apportionment (25%). The large
orange box represents the joint SoS mindset while the smaller green boxes identify areas
where joint SoS characteristics could be added to the UEI checklist.
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Figure 11: New AFIS UEI with focus on the joint SoS

o Rapid integration – Defines a wing’s ability to quickly assemble with
other services and stand up operations in any environment. The
characteristic focuses on creating a working and sustainable joint force.
Rapid integration occurs on a much quicker time scale than current
operations and requires wings to utilize and understand other service
equipment. It requires wings to integrate capabilities quickly in order to
quickly prosecute assigned mission. Rapid integration exploits time as a
weakness and requires the swift integration of forces who can immediately
conduct operations on short notice. To achieve this affect, wings must
engage with other service components assigned to the same
OPLAN/CONPLAN. Training should focus on the capabilities and
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communication equipment of other service assets and studying the wings
role within the larger framework. Services should pre-coordinate
necessary equipment to reduce weight and redundancy. Sharing resources
saves time and reduces the logistical trail.
o Rapid interoperability – Works hand in hand with rapid integration. This
characteristic assesses a wings ability to quickly share information and
capabilities to create synergistic effects focused on overwhelming the
enemy. Interoperability should be developed prior to deploying, as
services should exercise regularly in order to build and refine TTPs, test
communication equipment, activate networks, and develop redundant or
alternative methods.
o Joint Training – A specific task to ensure Wing/CCs are provided with and
in turn are offering joint training opportunities to their personnel. Training
should be properly documented upon completion and trainees should share
their experience with the rest of the wing. This characteristic looks at how
the Wing/CC manages his/her training budget and balances joint
requirements against platform requirements. It also looks at how often the
wing participates in multi-unit or joint exercises over a year period.
Outside a joint exercise, successfully meeting this requirement stipulates
wings maintain a robust training program based on assigned OPLANs and
CONPLANs. These training programs should contain sections dedicated
to friend force capabilities, interoperability issues, assigned
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responsibilities, and the affects of the wing’s role on the larger operation.
Finally, the characteristic looks to ensure leadership (W/CC at a
minimum) have attended a joint training course. This characteristic looks
to reduce risks associated with failing to understand the larger operation
and failing to know other service capabilities/limitations.
o Flexibility/Adaptability – This characteristic ties in with integration and
interoperability. Flexibility and adaptability look at a wings capability to
support other mission outside its primary and assigned missions. The use
of B-52 aircraft in a CAS role is an example from OEF/OIF. It examines a
leader’s ability to identify opportunities and weigh the risks and rewards.
It analysis how rapidly and efficiently wings can change missions and how
well the wing uses its equipment. Flexibility and adaptability tests a
wing’s ability to rapidly mission plan, identify other resources available
(could be another service), and utilize those resources to successfully
conduct the mission.
Leveraging Current Resources
Identifying joint characteristics is a key first step in integrating a joint SoS into
the AFIS. However, implementing these characteristics requires the resources and means
by which to evaluate them.
Currently there is a plethora of joint, service, and coalition exercises ranging from
larger scale operations to mission specific events. These exercises present a logical place
to implement a new joint SoS AFIS. Additional areas to explore include geographically
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related bases hosting regional exercises and the use of simulators for networked
exercises. In addition, the new AEF Next model creates a perfect cycle for integrating a
LFE for rotational forces. This work does not contain an all-inclusive list. It does;
however, provide examples of how to implement a joint SoS within these exercises and
why exercises provide a perfect fit.
Operation Angel Thunder, for example, is a joint exercise focusing specifically on
personnel recovery. Since its inception in 2006, Operation Angel Thunder continues to
grow in size and scope. Over the last several iterations, the exercise organizers have
added new scenarios and expanded the depth and breadth of training personnel receive.
Recently developed scenarios focus on rescue operations in jungle environments and at
extended ranges to account for aerial denial situations. Several ISR platforms and
coalition partners have also joined in, demonstrating/providing new capabilities and
producing new TTPs for integrated operations. The MC-12, for example, initially
developed its PR TTPs at Operations Angel Thunder. Once downrange, the wing refined
its PR TTPs, becoming a valuable communications relay asset for PR and aeromedical
evacuation assets7.

7

Personnel recovery and aeromedical evacuation are not taught at the MC-12 school house nor
have they been tested in wing exercises. These TTPs and capabilities were only discovered through joint
exercises
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In addition, many of these joint scenarios/exercises continue to grow, involving
cyber, space, RPAs, and coalition partners. Red Flag, the AF’s premier training event,
recently integrated all these facets into its 2014 exercise deck. These four areas
represent areas of interest to the joint chiefs and service secretaries. Red Flag was
specifically designed to provide cross platform and cross service training in a simulated
real operational environment. The exercises force services to operate together, learn each
others TTPs, and rely upon each other to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses through
combined affects (99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, 2012).
Red Flag 14-1 saw more than 125 aircraft from the US AF, Navy, and Marine
Corp attend the exercise, as well as aircraft and personnel from the Royal Australian Air
Force and Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom. According to General Hostage,
soldiers, sailors, and airmen “participated in advanced training, improving integration and
interoperability amongst our joint and allied partners” (Hostage, 2014). Events like Red
Flag develop those synergistic effects, which translate into future mission success.
The AFIS could also adopt a geographical approach to inspections. Exercise
Razor Talon is an east coast exercise hosted by Seymour Johnson AFB. Started as a way
to augment Red Flag and provide additional training for deploying units, Razor Talon has
expanded into a large joint force event. Unlike Red Flag, participating units prepare,
plan, and fly from their own bases. Exercise coordination and planning takes place over
teleconferences, Video Teleconferencing (VTC), or Defense Connect Online (DCO) Chat
functions. Wings alternate acting as the CAOC, directing and leading exercise
operations. Scenarios range from CAS, offensive counter air, to strike escort and
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Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). In addition, access to ranges with
simulated threats increases the exercises’ complexity.
The exercise has emerged as a popular venue due to its integrated nature with
other service and international partners. The exercise provides a rare opportunity to
interact with and fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the various assets.
“For example, Air Force pilots have opportunities to hear ship communications over the
radio” or fly and communicate with British and French forces (Boland, 2013).
In addition, the complexities of running such a large exercise, as well as hosting
coalition partners, create multiple interoperability and communication challenges.
Personnel improvise solutions on the go, learning valuable lessons about joint operations.
From its inception, the goal of Razor Talon was to “train like forces fight, and in the
field, the various nations are going to stand side by side” (Boland, 2013). Planners
wanted to provide as much realistic training as possible to help services and coalition
partners understand the challenges combine operations can create. Col Birch, 4th
OSS/CC stated (Boland, 2013):
“Through the exercises, decision makers have realized that they remain
unfamiliar with what real joint domain command and control is. For
example, the Air Force is still working out how to put surface vessels on
its network, a task integral to the Air-Sea Battle Concept.”
On a smaller scale, the AFIS could organize joint inspections around states or
areas with larger concentration of military bases. Virginia’s Hampton Roads area is a
perfect example with Naval, Army, and AF bases all within 40 miles of each other.
Alaska, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Texas also have multiple service bases
near each other.
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The capability exits to link actual AF, Navy, and Army assets participating in live
exercises with simulators and virtual trainers. Live Virtual Environment (LVE) and Live
Virtual Constructive (LVC) training/exercises are two commonly used terms
synonymous with these network link exercises. These two terms will be used
interchangeably throughout this work. The ability to join live missions with simulators
increasing the number of participants, the diversity of assets, and the level of realism.
LVEs gives planners the ability to shape the battlefield environment, providing control of
the weather, allowing injects to simulate the “fog and friction” of war, as well as
replicating threat systems, ranging from jamming, Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), and air threats, to name a few. The three services share similar future plans for
LVE training, all budgeting for newer more realistic simulators, expanded network
capabilities and nodes, increased data rates, upgrades to existing simulators, and software
solutions to include more assets (Catanzano, 2011). The three services are also pursuing
LVE capabilities, which will allow coalition partners to participate (Blacklock &
Zalcman, 2010).
In a recent article Colonel John T. Janiszewski, Director of the Army’s National
Simulation Center (NSC), stated virtual training “replicates the difficulties and
complications of the operational environment, enabling leaders and units to gain the
experience, confidence and skills required to execute decisive action” (Janiszewski,
2014). Further (and more relevant to current fiscal constraints), Col Janiszewski sees an
increased need and reliance on virtual training as augmenting or replacing live training.
Col Janiszewski stated virtual training is “effective, low-cost individual and collective
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training for soldiers and leaders” posing a viable alternative to expensive large force
exercises (Janiszewski, 2014).
ACC currently owns and operates the Distributed Mission Operations Center
(DMOC) located at Kirtland AFB, NM. The DMOC allows strategic, operational, and
tactical level virtual training allowing simulation across the range of military operations.
In addition, the DMOC “provides network connectivity to joint and coalition players
around the world” (Kirtland AFB Public Affairs Office, 2014). The DMOC hosts ACC’s
Virtual Flag (VF), “a CJCS sponsored, large force exercise designed to increase combat
capability across the Theater Air Control System and its elements” (Horne, 2013). In
addition to VF, the DMOC hosts other LVEs for specific assets. The DMOC can
replicate threat environments/systems and simulate attacks, forcing personnel to
cooperate and interact as they would in real life. Brigadier General Bradford J. Shwedo,
former Director of Intelligence ACC, stated in a policy memo to the field, “VF is an
excellent opportunity for the Air Force intelligence community to ‘train like we fight’
and to identify any shortfalls in our current training plans” (Shwedo, 2013).
The AEF Next concept explained in Chapter 2 creates an easy launching point for
CCs and the IG to implement the new AFIS. AEF Next packages units into air power
teams focused around core missions. Since the AEF Next concept centers on a teaming
concept, air power teams will always deploy with the same units and personnel. The IG
could implement LFEs around these air power teams capturing the units’ ability to work
amongst other teams. At any given time, the new AEF Next cycle has one team
returning, one team deployed, and one team preparing. The returning team and the
preparing teams could engage in a LFE for increased knowledge and experience
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dissemination. The returning team would act as a “red” team. Having just returned, their
knowledge of the enemy and emerging TTPs would provide a sound foundation for
assessing readiness. While intra-service, this system would still open the training
aperture ensuring wings interoperate and integrate at the AF level.
On a larger scale, further work could investigate if the AEF Next system aligns
with other service deployment cycles. In the same fashion, a joint LFE could be
conducted with returning and preparing forces. If it does not, research could be
conducted to determine how difficult it would be to adapt the AEF Next cycle to
synchronize with other services.

Findings: Unit of Analysis 3 – Limitations of the SoS Approach
IG Perspective
Discussions with ACC/IG personnel regarding integrating a joint SoS architecture
into the AFIS provide insight into their current philosophy. The AF core values represent
and reflect the joint nature of today’s military. The joint competencies were developed
by the services and the AF embodies these competencies in its doctrine, philosophy, and
values. The number of shared weapon systems, TTPs, and communications equipment
used today, by all the services, continues to grow, and the AF led the procurement of
several of these systems. “Jointness” is percolating down to the wings and units through
the philosophical changes at the headquarters level and exemplified in the AF core
competencies: Developing Airmen, technology to war fighting and integrating
operations (Air Combat Command, 2013). Units share resources, lessons learned, and
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TTPs more often these days providing a continuous cycle of growth at the wing level and
below.
The AFIS places an emphasis on the Wing/CC’s ability to lead and develop
his/her wing as he/she feels necessary. In creating a Wing/IG role, the new AFIS is
attempting to create “buy in” from wing personnel. It is attempting to break away from
the old philosophy where units prepared for IG inspections then redid everything in
preparation for deploying. The Wing/CC creates his/her own inspection program,
identifying their areas of concern, improvement, and/or strengths. Since the Wing/CCs
create the checklists, the AFIS found a way to capture the unique functions of every unit.
The Wing/CCs drives how “joint” capable the wing is through his/her CCIP, based on the
wing’s assigned OPLAN/CONPLANS, its unique qualities/missions, vision, and goal.
These changes to the AFIS were developed to create the mission ready attitude and focus
mentioned earlier.
The role of the MAJCOM/IG is to observe and audit how well the Wing/IG
program articulates the CC’s vision and goal and inspects, documents, and follows up on
wing deficiencies. In areas where the MAJCOM/IG does not feel the CCIP is properly
identifying and capturing risks, the MAJCOM/IG can step in and correct or ask to
observe operations. Unless directed from above, the MAJCOM/IG does not enforce an
agenda. The ACC/IG philosophy is that individual wing inspections identify enough risk
that integration into the larger SoS is minimal. The governing regulations which form the
basis for MAJCOM and wing IG programs are developed in accordance with AF core
competencies and thus capture the joint criteria necessary for integration. The ACC/IG
believes the Wing/CC is the optimal person to decide the wing’s priorities and the
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necessary joint priorities. In addition, the AFIS allows Wing/CCs to use exercises,
training, and deployment results to highlight wing performance and complete/validate
inspection items as long as results are documented and verified by the wing/IG (Secretary
of the Air Force, 2012). Further, per 90-201 the MAJCOM/IG still reserves the right to
conduct no or little notice inspections or mandate wings conduct “ORI” like events to
validate CCIP findings. Bottom line, ACC/IG’s philosophy maintains that AF core
competencies are based on joint requirements. Wings will practice their roles as defined
in their OPLAN/CONPLANS and execute those roles in combat. The IG grades the
individual wings and hopes the pieces, when put together during joint operations,
integrate and interoperate based on prior practice.
According to IG personnel, there has never been a joint inspection or meeting of
service IG programs to discuss joint operations. Further, within ACC, there has never
been a multi-wing inspection, nor have ACC/IG personnel attended LFEs with the intent
of inspecting units. Whenever possible, the ACC/IG Gatekeeper, who organizes and
schedules all inspections levied on ACC units, ensures inspections are TF. TF refers to
wings that have an associated guard or reserve squadron. In these cases all units are
inspected at once. In addition, all ACC/IG inspections include a red air component to
help simulate adversary tactics. Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) and
contested/degraded operations where added to ACC/IG inspections in late 2011 and
quickly become more common.
LFE Resource Burdon
The ACC/IG provided details defending a single wing inspection construct. The
four reasons provided closely match those given by ACC staff and wing personnel
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1) funding
2) a small cadre of inspectors
3) synchronization
4) identify unique wing functions.
When inspecting multiple systems interacting at once, it becomes difficult to see the
minor details occurring behind the larger operation. The MAJCOM/IG looks to increase
wing efficiency and identify areas of risk. While primary operations may look good,
subsurface operations may be weak. During LFEs, MAJCOM/IG personnel may miss
subtle details due to the added commotion. Compounding this issue is the need for
additional inspectors to cover the additional wings participating in the joint exercise.
Also, geographically separated wings create communication challenges for MAJCOM/IG
personnel. The strength of a single wing inspection is having all inspectors at one
location. Inspectors can hold impromptu meetings to quick deliberate and share
information. These meetings are a critical part of the inspection process, keeping all
inspectors informed of findings. Adding other service organizations adds to these issues.
The coordination efforts required to synchronize a joint exercise, inspectors, and
communication from each of the service components imposes significant manpower and
time requirements. Funding is really a by-product of the three previously mentioned
reasons but is necessary to hire additional inspectors and offset the added costs for
planning and coordinating LFEs.
LFEs as a training Environment
Allowing inspectors access to LFEs could distract from the exercise’s intended
purpose. Most units use LFEs as opportunities to focus on integration issues, refining
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proficiency skills, and developing new TTPs. A pilot referred to LFEs as lower stress
events meant to improve personal skills and work out the bugs, whereas inspections are
high stress events focusing on the minute details. Authorizing MAJCOM/IG personnel to
monitor LFEs shifts the focus away from personal growth to meeting inspection criteria.
LFEs are venues for units to fail without repercussions. With inspectors on sight, units
may not be willing to take “learning” risks.
In order to counter this philosophy, MAJCOM/IG personnel must evaluate a
wing’s performance in light of the LFE’s intended purpose. The AFIS’s structure, if
adhered to, compensates for this dilemma. The MAJCOM/IG’s focus should be on
monitoring the wing/IG and the Wing/CC’s leadership capability. If the wing’s IG is
going to evaluate the unit during the LFE, the MAJCOM/IG should also be authorized.
This separates out LFEs designed for training and development versus LFEs for mission
compliance.
LFEs; however, provide pertinent insight into a wings ability to adapt and flex to
changing mission conditions, two of the recommended joint characteristics. Several wing
personnel pointed out LFEs are often free flowing and a little disorganized which
presents a challenge to overcome communication issues or unclear guidance. These are
two issues units often face during joint operations. In addition, wing personnel noted
LFEs (and deployments) sometimes uncover problems that cannot be resolved at the
wing level. Personnel noted communication/systems integration issues or conflicting
guidance/standards between service organizations as two examples. These issues go
above wing levels and are outside the scope of a Wing/CC to solve. Identifying these
issues prior to deploying greatly reduces risk; however, discovery of these types of
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integration issues is impossible during single wing inspections. The MAJCOM/IG is in a
position to address these issues with other service organizations or at higher AF levels.
Adopting a joint SoS architecture and attributes compels wings to look at, address, and
raise these concerns prior to deploying.
IG and wing personnel also noted that LFEs do not test every aspect of a wings
mission/capability. LFEs often focus on one mission or operational aspect and only
include the required wing functions or organizations. In this light, the joint SoS provides
less insight than a regular wing inspection. There are two ways to correct this shortfall.
One is to create larger LFEs which engage all organizations. The second is to send IG
personnel to more focused exercises (like Angel Thunder) to ensure all components are
evaluated. Both corrections require additional funds and time.
Competing Systems
The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is a CJCS program designed to
provide JFCs and COCOMs a more efficient and effective tool for quickly identifying the
readiness status of forces down to the unit level (for the AF, squadron level). DRRS also
synthesizes “unit and joint force readiness to describe the ability of the armed forces as a
whole to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy,” and can reflect
the current readiness of all COCOMS (Trunkey, 2013). DRRS pulls unit manpower,
equipment, training, and readiness information from the AF’s AEF UTC Reporting Tool
(ART) and DoDs Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) databases. In
addition, DRRS allows commanders to input supplementary information which may
impact readiness like morale and unit confidence. DRRS also asks CCs to rate a “unit
against its actual assigned mission, anticipated mission, and core mission” (Trunkey,
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2013). The assigned mission comes from the unit’s Designed Operational Capability
(DOC) statement and the core mission comes from what the weapon system was
designed to do. The capability of DRRS to capture qualitative and quantitative
information makes it a valuable tool for CCs to identify deficiencies.
DRRS is not fully implemented across the services but is expected to become
fully operational in 2014 (Trunkey, 2013). Overall, DRRS does show promise as a way
to capture unit readiness information as well as larger COCOM readiness. However, it
lacks a way to identify risks associated with interoperability or integration. To assess
COCOM readiness, DRRS tabulates scores from multiple units and provides an overall
score. The DRRS score does represent risk, based on the numerical difference between
all units reporting 100% readiness and actual readiness values. In addition, DRRS does
not independently verify and validate CCs’ inputs. ACC/IG and Staff members, who
currently work with DRRS, ART, and SORTs, stated it is easy to “cover up” wing issues
in these programs as they are computer entries and authorized inputs are not always clear.
CCs do not want to look bad on paper and often inflate scores to appear healthier than
they actually are.

Investigative Questions Answered
Chapter 4 provided answers to all five investigative questions found in Chapter 1.
Question one though was primarily answered in Chapter 2.
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations?
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system?
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3. How does the current system account for the integrated nature of military
assets during operations?
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation
to an operational readiness inspection?
5. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and
determine the status and health of ACC units?
Summary
Chapter 4 presented supporting data to defend the hypothesis through validation
of three UOAs. UOA 1 explained key differences between the AFIS single wing
inspection system and joint operations. A risk analysis identified how these differences
translate into increased risk when wings operate in a joint environment. Conversations
with AF personnel, fratricide statistics, and deployment experiences provided additional
facts and explanations supporting the risk analysis results. UOA 2 explored several joint
characteristics which should be added to the UEI checklist to help incorporate a joint SoS
approach into the current AFIS. UOA 2 further examined how adopting a joint SoS
architecture requires a mentality shift where mission readiness means joint readiness.
This mentality shift leverages the new UEI joint characteristics to help refocus wings.
Last, UOA 2 provides example exercises or existing capabilities (simulators) which allow
the IG to implement a new joint SoS AFIS in short order. UOA 3 provided counter
arguments to adopting a joint SoS and included discussion and comments from ACC/IG
personnel.
Chapter 4 clearly showed there is a need to approach the AFIS from a SoS
approach. There currently exists large amounts of risk between wing and joint
operations. If not addressed, the level of risk will continue to increase as the military
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moves towards a smaller more integrated force. This change requires a paradigm shift in
how ACC defines unit readiness and its willingness to lead the change where mission
ready is joint ready
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
Chapter 5 provides a short synopsis of the previous four chapters highlighting the
significance of the research as well as recommended actions. Chapter 5 also contains
information on future research areas which could affect this work’s conclusions

Conclusions of Research
This work identified a source of unknown risk and offered a viable solution. The
study showed there is a disparity between wing and joint operations, which the AFIS
does not fully account for. The AFIS should assess units within the joint operation
environment to provide a better analysis of wing readiness

Significance of Research
Assessing a wing within the joint SoS has many benefits. First, risks associated
with integration and interoperability will be reduced. Second, overall wing readiness will
improve. Third, ACC/CC, COCOMs, SECDEF, and JCS will have a way to validate
DRRS information. These benefits are significant because the development of a more
closely aligned and capable force prior to the beginning of hostilities allows CCs to
immediately exploit the synergistic effects of the services without the normal delays or
failures systems integration has historically had. In addition, implementing a joint
inspection system may reduce fratricide rates by allowing the early detection of the
leading causes attributing to friendly force incidents.
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Not implementing the changes recommended in chapter 4 creates an area of
growing risk. In the short term units will continue to struggle with integration and
interoperability. However, in the long run, as the services become more integrated the
amount of unchecked risk could lead to failed operations and higher fratricide rates.

Recommendations for Action
Recommendations based on this work include three actions necessary to adopt a
joint SoS architectural viewpoint into today’s AFIS. The first recommendation is to
implement the joint characteristics mentioned in Chapter 4, UOA 2. To due so, ACC/CC
should issue a Memorandum for Record (MFR) to the field making “jointness” a SII
within ACC. Further, the AFIS checklist, MGAs, and AFIs will need to be republished
to incorporate joint operations and interoperability as key items for wings to practice
during home station preparation, exercise planning, training, and equipment procurement.
Recommendation two enhances the first action. ACC should take lead on
developing and sustaining additional joint training courses or exercises for all ranks and
AFSCs. Within ACC, standardize the definition of joint operations and create a
mandatory course for all Wing/CCs. This reduces risks created by the diverse
backgrounds of wing commanders, which fuels the current inconsistent understanding of
joint operations. In addition, ACC should prepare a staff assistance team knowledgeable
in joint operations to provide support and training to wings as they begin shifting to a
joint SoS viewpoint.
The third recommendation involves starting joint inspections. This
recommendation should not occur until recommendations two and three are complete. In
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the beginning, ACC should implement the joint inspections at a manageable level and
develop the capability further through trials (similar to spiral development). Inspections
should begin in the AF with multi-wing inspections. Use air power teams as a way to
select wings. As inspectors and wings become more comfortable and TTPs are refined,
integrate other service IG members into AF inspections. Allow these outside inspector
the opportunity to participate and add their service viewpoint to inspection results. From
here, develop an inter-service inspection working group to define what joint inspections
are and how they will be handled, graded, reported, etc.
Recommendation three will require the most work as ACC cannot act unilaterally
at that point. It is within ACC’s power to issue an SII on joint operations and conduct
multi wing inspections of ACC units. However this only provides a limited view of the
larger joint SoS. The services are all pursuing “jointness” but no one is on the same
page. Without buy in from other organizations, this plan becomes just another “joint”
effort without a “joint” understanding.

Recommendations for Future Research
Four areas for further examination were identified while conducting research in
support of this thesis. Area one pertains to defining the type of SoS architecture
reflective of joint operations. This is a System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) question
that directly impacts how joint operations interact and influence the multiple systems,
which form the larger SoS. It is equally important to analyze and determine the different
types of SoS architectures each service uses. What is the risk associated with applying
the wrong SoSE approach? The DoD SoSE guide currently recognizes virtual and
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acknowledged architectures as the two prominent SoS architectures. However, the guide
is specifically written to address acknowledged SoSs. It does not address how different
SoS architectures influence each other or the influences between systems and SoSs. It
also does not address what architecture joint operations resemble and how to handle
constantly changing SoSs. The relationship between a system and its parent organization
(service branch) versus its joint organization may change how the characteristics listed in
Chapter 4 are implemented. Further research into this area will produce significant
information on how joint operations should be formed as well as how joint requirements
should be integrated into service acquisition programs.
As stated in Chapter 1, the scope of this project does not include a cost analysis
for joint versus single inspections. Shrinking defense budgets require prudent use of
limited funds. Further research into costs will have to account for manpower hours to
plan and coordinate joint and wing exercises as well as travel and equipment costs.
Analysis of costs should be paired with the third purposed research area, effects of joint
metrics/inspections on readiness.
The recommendations of work include adding joint attributes to the AFIS
inspection checklist as well as current exercises for implementing a joint SoS inspection
architecture. If implemented, further research should quantify the effects of joint
metrics/inspections on readiness. If possible, a potential “test” case of select wings and
other services units could be used as a sample set. Implement the new AFIS over this
small sample set to determine feasibility and outcome (beneficial or not, to what extent,
and at what cost).
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Summary
The ACC/IG is responsible for determining the readiness of ACC forces.
Through the use of the AFIS, the IG reports the efficiency, effectiveness and combat
readiness of units to the ACC/CC. Through the use of checklists, interviews, and
observation, the IG determines a unit’s ability to fulfill its wartime mission requirements.
Today’s wars however, are waged as a Joint Force, where the COCOM leverages
the resources available to achieve a strategic outcome. Objectives are met through the
coordination and combination of military capabilities provided by the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. Battles are no longer fought by a single service or single weapons system, but
as a collective one. The joint force is a complex SoS, where the success of the whole
relies on each individual component to fulfill their role within the structure. This
integration allows CCs to harness the synergistic effects of his/her forces to bring
decisive firepower to the battlefield and exploit the enemy’s weakness.
Currently the AFIS inspects a single wing at a time to determine combat
effectiveness. The AFIS does not directly acknowledging the joint SoS architecture and
the relationship between the SoS and subsystems. The combat effectiveness of a wing is
largely based on how well it operates within this larger SoS. Given the ever-growing
joint nature of the US military, the AFIS should assess units through a larger SoS
framework. Adapting this approach reduces integration risk prior to deployment and
provides a better assessment of wing readiness.
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Appendix A: 90-201 Checklist References
The AFIS uses the following list of references to create the IG inspection
checklist and evaluate unit readiness.
1.

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) Playbook, Oct 09

2.

AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System, 19 Apr 13

3.

AFI 10-206, Operational Reporting, 6 Sep 11 AFI 10-207, Command Posts, 1 Feb
12

4.

AFI 10-208, Air Force Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program, 15 Dec 11

5.

AFI 10-210, Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program, 6 Sep 12

6.

AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), 21 Sep 12 AFI 10-250, Individual Medical
Readiness, 9 Mar 07

7.

AFI 10-301, Responsibilities of Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces, 16 Aug 06

8.

AFI 10-404, Base Support and Expeditionary (BAS&E) Site Planning, 11 Oct 11

9.

AFI 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 8 Jun 11

10.

AFI 10-702, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), 7 Jun 11

11.

AFI 10-704, Military Deception Program, 30 Aug 05

12.

AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and
Operations, 24 Jan 07

13.

AFI 10-2603, Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations, 13 Oct 10

14.

AFI 10-2604, Disease Containment Planning (FOUO), 3 Sep 10

15.

AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 1, Aircrew Training (Note: Published by MDS as
applicable)

16.

AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 2, Aircrew Evaluation Criteria (Note: Published by MDS
as applicable)
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17.

AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 3, MDS, Operations Procedures (Note: Published by MDS
as applicable)

18.

AFI 11-202 Volume 1, Aircrew Training, 22 Nov 10

19.

AFI 11-202, Volume 2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program, 13 Sep 10

20.

AFI 11-202 Volume 3, General Flight Rules, 22 Oct 10

21.

AFI 11-230, Instrument Procedures, 30 Mar 10

22.

AFI 11-299, Nuclear Airlift Operations (FOUO), 19 Mar 08

23.

AFI 13-1AOCV1, Ground Environment Training—Air Operations Center (AOC), 7
Dec 11

24.

AFI 13-1AOCV2, Standardization/Evaluation Program—Air and Space Operations
Center, 1 Aug 05

25.
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26.

AFI 13-1AOCV3, Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (AOC), 2 Nov
11

27.

AFI 13-204, Volume 1, Airfield Operations Career Field Development, 9 May 13

28.

AFI 13-204, Volume 2, Airfield Operations Standardization and Evaluation, 01 Sep
10

29.

AFI 13-204, Vol 3, Airfield Operations Procedures and Programs, 01 Sep 10 (Ch 1,
9 Jan 10)

30.

AFI 13-216, Evaluation of Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems, 05 May 2005

31.

AFI 13-503, Nuclear-Capable Unit Certification, Decertification and Restriction
Program, 2 Oct 12

32.

AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities, 23 Apr 12

33.

AFI 14-202V1, Intelligence Training, 10 Mar 08

34.

AFI 14-202V2 Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program, 10 Mar 08

35.

AFI 14-202V3, General Intelligence Rules, 10 Mar 08

36.

AFI 16-701, Special Access Programs, 1 Nov 95
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37.

AFI 16-1301, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program, 6 Sep 06

38.

AFI 21-204, Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures, 30 Nov 09

39.

AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO), 8 Oct 09

40.

AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management, 1 Nov 05

41.

AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, 27 Jan 05

42.

AFI 31-601, Industrial Security Program Management, 29 Jun 05

43.

AFI 32-7001, Environmental Management, 4 Nov 11

44.

AFI 33-150, Management of Cyberspace Support Activities, 30 Nov 11

45.

AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 7 Feb 13

46.

AFI 34-219, Alcoholic Beverage Program, 17 Oct 07

47.

AFI 35-101, Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management, 18 Aug 10

48.

AFI 35-102, Security and Policy Review Process, 20 Oct 09

49.

AFI 35-103, Public Affairs Travel, 26 Jan 10

50.

AFI 35-104, Media Operations, 22 Jan 10

51.

AFI 35-105, Community Relations, 26 Jan 10

52.

AFI 35-107, Public Web Communications, 21 Oct 09

53.

AFI 35-108, Environmental Public Affairs, 8 Mar 10 AFI 35-109, Visual
Information, 12 Mar 10

54.

AFI 35-110, U.S. Air Force Band Program, 22 Jan 10

55.

AFI 35-111, Public Affairs Contingency Operations and Wartime Readiness, 28
Oct 09

56.

AFI 35-113, Internal Information, 11 Mar 10

57.

102 AFI 90-201 2 August 2013

58.

AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 15 Sep 10

59.

AFI 36-2640, Executing Total Force Development, 16 Dec 08
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60.

AFI 36-3009, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, 7 May 13

61.

AFI 36-3107, Voting Assistance Program, 10 Sep 03

62.

AFI 36-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 29 Sep 08

63.

AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness Program Management, 1 Jul 11

64.

AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, 8 Aug 12

65.

AFI 64-117, Air Force Government-Wide Purchase Card (GPC) Program, 20 Sep
11

66.

AFI 65-501, Economic Analysis, 29 Aug 11

67.

AFI 90-201 ANGSUP 1, Inspector General Activities, 2 Mar 10

68.

AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints Resolution, 23 Aug 11

69.

AFI 90-501, Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery
System, 31 Aug 06

70.

AFI 90-505, Suicide Prevention Program, 10 Aug 12

71.

AFI 90-803, Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance
Assessment and Management Program, 24 Mar 10

72.

AFI 90-1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration, 29 May 07 AFI 91-101,
Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 13 Oct 10

73.

AFI 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive
Material Safety Program, 21 Sep 10

74.

AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program, 5 Aug 11

75.

AFI 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports, 24 Sep 08

76.

AFI 91-207, The US Air Force Traffic Safety Program, 27 Oct 11

77.

AFI 91-302, Air Force Occupational and Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, and
Health (AFOSH) Standards, 18 Apr 94

78.

AFJI 11-204, Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials, 11
Nov 94

79.

AFMAN 11-226 (I), US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS)
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80.

AFMAN 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standards and
Procedures, 25 Sep 09

81.

AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,
and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment, 7 Jul 11

82.

AFMAN 10-2504, Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents
and Natural Disasters, 13 Mar 13

83.

AFMAN 10-2605, Education, Training and Exercise Competencies for CounterChemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations, 30 Jun 08

84.

AFMAN 15-129V1, Air and Space Weather Operations – Characterization, 6 Dec
11

85.

AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 103

86.

AFMAN 15-129V2, Air and Space Weather Operations—Exploitation, 07 Dec 11

87.

AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 Mar 08

88.

AFMAN 65-506, Economic Analysis, 29 Aug 11

89.

AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, 12 Jan 11

90.

AFPD 10-7, Information Operations, 6 Sep 06

91.

AFPD 10-24, Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), 28 Apr 06

92.

AFPD 10-25, Emergency Management, 26 Sep 07

93.

AFPD 14-1, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning,
Resources, and Operations, 2 Apr 04

94.

AFPD 16-7, Special Access Programs, 29 Dec 10

95.

AFPD 32-70, Environmental Quality, 20 Jul 94

96.

AFPD 36-60, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 28 Mar 08

97.

AFPD 65-5, Cost and Economics, 5 Aug 08

98.

AFPD 90-2, Inspector General-The Inspection System, 26 Apr 06

99.

AFPD 90-8, Environment, Safety & Occupational Health Management and Risk
Management, 2 Feb 12
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100. AFOSII 90-201, Inspector General Activities, 2 May 05
101. T.O. 11N-35-51, Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection
System, 19 Feb 08
102. CG-W-5, Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide
103. CJCSI 3261.01B, Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons, 3 Nov 08
104. CJCSI 3260.01C, Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices, 30
Jun 11
105. CJCSI 3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections, 4 Jun 10
106. Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 Template
107. DOD 3150.2-M, DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, 23 Dec
1996
108. DOD S-5210.41-M, The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, 25 Apr 13
109. DOD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP), 13 Nov 06
110. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons, 1 Dec 1982
111. DOD 5400.7-R_AFMAN 33-302, Freedom of Information Act Program, 21 Oct 10
112. DODI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), 13 Sep 12
113. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, 12 Apr 10
114. DODD 1332.35, Transition Assistance for Military Personnel, 9 Dec 1993
115. 104 AFI 90-201 2 August 2013
116. DODD 3020.26, Department of Defense Continuity Programs, 9 Jan 09
117. DODD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 21 Sep
12
118. DODD 3150.02, DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 24 Apr 13.
119. DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), 15 Sep 10
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120. DODI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIO) Management, 21
Apr 08
121. DODD 4715.1E, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH), 19 Mar
05
122. DODI 4715.6, Environmental Compliance, 24 Apr 96
123. DODI 4715.17, Environmental Management Systems, 15 Apr 09
124. DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901, Minimum Security Standards for Safeguarding
Biological Select Agents and Toxins, 22 Jun 10
125. DODI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures, 23
Jun 06
126. DODI 6055.05, Occupational and Environmental Health, 11 Nov 08
127. DODI 6055.1, DOD Safety and Occupational Health Program, 19 Aug 98
128. DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program, 28 Mar
13
129. DODM 5105.21-V1, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative
Security Manual: Administration of Information and Information Systems Security,
21 Oct 12
130. DODM 5105.21-V2, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative
Security Manual: Administration of Physical Security, Visitor Control, and
Technical Security, 21 Oct 12
131. DODM 5105.21-V3, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative
Security Manual: Administration of Personnel Security, Industrial Security, and
Special Activities, 21 Oct 12
132. DODM 5200.01V1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification,
And Declassification, 24 Feb 12
133. DODM 5200.01V2, DOD Information Security Program: Marking Of Classified
Information, 24 Feb 12
134. DODM 5200.01V3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection Of Classified
Information, 24 Feb 12
135. DODM 5200.01V4, DOD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI), 24 Feb 12
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136. DOD IG Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines HAF Mission
Directive (MD) 1-20, The Inspector General, 23 Apr 2008
137. HQ USAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 13-01, Implementation of the
Secretary of the United States Air Force Direction to Implement a New Air Force
Inspection System, 10 Jun 2013
138. Executive Order 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal
Employees, 26 Feb 80
139. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 Dec 1981
140. AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 105
141. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, National Preparedness, 30 Mar 11
142. Executive Order 12333 as amended by EO 13284(2003), 13355(2004) and
13470(2008)
143. Executive Order 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and
Transportation Management, 24 Jan 07
144. Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 05 Jan 2010
145. Title 10 United States Code § 8020, Inspector General, Mar 04
146. Title 10 United States Code § 8583, Requirement of Exemplary Conduct
147. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, Policies and Procedures, 1
Jul 2013
148. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic
Incidents, 28 Feb 03
149. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY2008, House Record (H.R.) 4986,
Section 1662, Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient
Residential Facilities
150. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
151. National Response Framework (NRF), Jan 08
152. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), Oct 12
153. Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2), Oct 12
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154. Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Action Plan (AP) Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) 2004-01, Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) (Ground), 1 Jan 12
155. JCAS AP MOA 2004-02, Joint Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)), 1 Feb
12 ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard, 3 Nov 11
156. Department Of Defense Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Base
Implementation, 22 January 08
157. Fire Emergency Services Assessment Program (FESAP) Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC)
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Appendix B: Risk Diamond Approach
Exerts from Professors Shenhar and Dvir’s book Reinventing Project
Management. The below paragraphs provide Shenhar and Dvir’s definitions for the four
dimensions and there different levels.
Table 5: NTCP dimensions and levels

NTCP	
  Model
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Dimensions
	
  	
  	
  Levels

Novelty

Technology

Complexity

Pace

1

Derivative

Low-‐tech

Assembly

Regular

2

Platform

Medium-‐tech

System

Fast/Competitive

3

Breakthrough

High-‐tech

Array

Time-‐critical

4

Super-‐high-‐tech

Blitz

Novelty: Product novelty is defined by how new the product is to its markets and
potential users. This dimension represents the extent to which customers are familiar
with this kind of product, the way to use it, and its benefits. It also represents the
uncertainty of your project goal – that is, how clearly you can define the requirements
and customer needs up front.

•

Derivative products are extensions and improvements of existing products

•

Platform products are new generations of existing product lines. Such
products replace previous products in a well-established market sector. A
typical example is a new car model.
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•

Breakthrough products are new-to-the-world products. They transform a new
concept or a new idea into a new product that customers have never seen
before. The first Sony Walkman and the first 3M Post-it notes are typical
examples

Technology: The major source of task uncertainty is technological uncertainty.
Technological uncertainty has an impact on, among other things, design and testing,
communication and interaction, the timing of design freeze, and the needed number of
design cycles. It also affects the technical competence needed by the project manager
and project team members.

•

Low-tech projects rely on existing and well-established technologies. The
most typical examples are construction projects.

•

Medium-tech projects use mainly existing or base technologies but
incorporate a new technology or a new feature that did not exist in previous
products. Examples include products in stable industries, such as appliances,
automobiles, or heavy equipment

•

High-tech projects represent situations in which most of the technologies
employed are new to the firm but already exist and are available at project
initiation. Most computer and defense development projects belong to this
category

•

Super-high-tech projects are based on new technologies that do not exist at
project initiation. Although the mission is clear, the solution is not, and new
technologies must be developed during the project. A good example is the
moon-landing program

Complexity: Project complexity is directly related to system scope and affects
project organization and the formality of project management. Three typical levels of
complexity are used to distinguish among project management practices. A lower scope
level can be seen as a subsystem of the next higher level.

•

Assembly projects involve creating a collection of elements, components, and
modules combined into a single unit or entity that performs a single function.
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Assembly projects may produce a simple stand-alone product (such as a CD
player or a coffee machine) or build a subsystem of a larger system (such as
an automobile transmission). They may also involve building a new
organization that is responsible for a single function (such as payroll).
•

System projects involve a complex collection of interactive elements and
subsystems, jointly performing multiple functions to meet a specific
operational need. System projects may build products such as cars,
computers, or buildings, or they may deal with the creation of entire new
businesses that include several functions.

•

Array projects deal with a large, widely dispersed collection of systems that
function together to achieve a common purpose (sometimes they are called
“systems of systems” or “super systems”). Examples of arrays include
national communications networks, a mass transit infrastructure, or regional
power distribution networks, as well as entire corporations.

Pace: On this scale, projects differ by urgency (or how much time is available)
and by what happens if time goals are not met. Pace impacts the autonomy of project
teams, the bureaucracy, the speed of decision making, and the intensity of top
management involvement.

•

Regular projects are those efforts where time is not critical to immediate
organizational success.

•

Fast/competitive projects are the most common projects carried out by
industrial and profit-driven organizations. They are typically conceived to
address market opportunities, create a strategic positioning, or form new
business lines.

•

Time-critical projects must be completed by a specific date, which is
constrained by a definite event or a window of opportunity. Missing the
deadline means project failure. Examples might be the launch of a space
vehicle based on a specific cosmic constellation, or the Y2K project.

•

Blitz projects are the most urgent, most time-critical. These are crisis
projects. Solving the crisis as fast as possible is the criterion for success.
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